



NO 59 / APRIL 2007
THE ECB SURVEY OF 
PROFESSIONAL 
FORECASTERS (SPF) 
A REVIEW AFTER EIGHT 
YEARS’ EXPERIENCE 
by Carlos Bowles, Roberta Friz, 
Veronique Genre, Geoff Kenny, 
Aidan Meyler and Tuomas RautanenOCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES
NO 59 / APRIL 2007
This paper can be downloaded without charge from 
http://www.ecb.int or from the Social Science Research Network 
electronic library at http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=967604.
THE ECB SURVEY OF 
PROFESSIONAL 
FORECASTERS (SPF) 
A REVIEW AFTER EIGHT 
YEARS’ EXPERIENCE * 
by Carlos Bowles, Roberta Friz, 
Veronique Genre, Geoff Kenny, 
Aidan Meyler and Tuomas Rautanen
In 2007 all ECB 
publications 
feature a motif 
taken from the 
€20 banknote.
*    This work was carried out while all the authors were working in the Euro Area Macroeconomic Developments Division of the 
ECB. The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the European Central 
Bank (ECB). We would like to thank Juan Angel Garcia, Hans-Joachim Klöckers, Gerard Korteweg, Bettina Landau, Klaus Masuch, 
participants at a Eurosystem Monetary Policy Committee seminar and an anonymous ECB referee for their useful comments. 
Any errors are of course the sole responsibility of the authors. Corresponding author: Aidan Meyler (aidan.meyler@ecb.int). 
Individual anonymised SPF data are available upon request, for further information please contact ecb-spf@ecb.int© European Central Bank, 2007
Address
Kaiserstrasse 29
60311 Frankfurt am Main
Germany
Postal address
Postfach 16 03 19
60066 Frankfurt am Main
Germany
Telephone




+49 69 1344 6000
Telex
411 144 ecb d
All rights reserved. Any reproduction, 
publication or reprint in the form of a 
different publication, whether printed or 
produced electronically, in whole or in 
part, is permitted only with the explicit 
written authorisation of the ECB or the 
author(s).
The views expressed in this paper do 










EXECUTIVE SUMMARY  5
1 INTRODUCTION  9
2 SHORT-  TO  MORE  MEDIUM-TERM 
FORECASTING PERFORMANCE  13
2.1  Forecast performance statistics 
for the aggregate SPF 13
2.2  Testing for bias in the SPF 18
2.3  Comparing SPF and Consensus 
Economics forecasts 20
2.4  Heterogeneity and individual 
forecast performance 21
3 ASSESSING  FORECAST  UNCERTAINTY 
USING THE SPF  28
3.1 Alternative  dispersion-based 
uncertainty indicators from 
the SPF 29
3.2   Comparison of alternative 
uncertainty indicators from 
the SPF 32
3.3  Other characteristics of the 
forecast probability distribution 34
3.4  Overall assessment of uncertainty 
measures 36
4  SPF LONG-TERM EXPECTATIONS  37
4.1  Long-term inflation expectations: 
an indicator of the ECB’s 
credibility 38
4.2  Long-term real GDP growth 
expectations: a view on trend 
potential output growth 42
4.3 Long-term  unemployment 
expectations 45
5  CONCLUDING REMARKS AND FUTURE SPF 
RESEARCH 47
ANNEXES
1  Is there bias in the SPF forecast 
results? Evidence from a panel 
data analysis 49
2  A closer look at individual 
forecaster quality 52
3  The probability forecasts from 




OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES  654
ECB 
Occasional Paper No 59
April 2007
ABSTRACT
Eight years have passed since the European 
Central Bank (ECB) launched its Survey of 
Professional Forecasters (SPF). The SPF asks a 
panel of approximately 75 forecasters located 
in the European Union (EU) for their short- to 
longer-term expectations for macroeconomic 
variables such as euro area inflation, growth 
and unemployment. This paper provides an 
initial assessment of the information content 
of this survey. First, we consider shorter-term 
(i.e., one- and two-year ahead rolling horizon) 
forecasts. The analysis suggests that, over the 
sample period, in common with other private 
and institutional forecasters, the SPF 
systematically under-forecast inflation but that 
there is less evidence of such systematic errors 
for GDP and unemployment forecasts. However, 
these findings, which generally hold regardless 
of whether one considers the aggregate SPF 
panel or individual responses, should be 
interpreted with caution given the relatively 
short sample period available for the analysis. 
Second, we consider SPF respondents’ 
assessment of forecast uncertainty using 
information from their probability distributions. 
The results suggest that, particularly at the 
individual level, SPF respondents do not seem 
to fully capture the overall level of 
macroeconomic uncertainty. Moreover, even at 
the aggregate level, a more sophisticated 
evaluation of the SPF density forecasts using 
the probability integral transform largely 
confirms this assessment. Lastly, we consider 
longer-term macroeconomic expectations from 
the SPF, where, as expectations cannot yet be 
assessed against so few actual realisations, we 
provide a mainly qualitative assessment. With 
regard to inflation, the study suggests that the 
ECB has been successful at anchoring long-
term expectations at rates consistent with its 
primary objective to ensure price stability over 
the medium term. Long-term GDP expectations 
– which should provide an indication of the 
private sector’s assessment of potential growth 
– have declined over the sample period and the 
balance of risks reported by respondents has 
generally been skewed to the downside. 
Consistent with this, respondents have generally 
reported the balance of risks to their long-term 
unemployment expectations to be to the upside 
citing concerns as to whether required structural 
reforms in the labour market will be undertaken 
as the main factor behind this risk assessment.5
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
According to economic theory, expectations 
play a crucial role in how the economy functions, 
as well as in how, and the extent to which, 
policy agents, including central banks, can 
influence macroeconomic outcomes.1 At the 
most fundamental level, this reflects the idea 
that economic agents, both firms and households, 
have strong incentives to make their key 
economic decisions (e.g. consumption, 
investment or price-setting) in a way that 
optimally takes into account the likely future 
developments of the economic variables 
relevant to such decisions. In line with the 
importance of expectations in understanding 
the functioning of the economy, the European 
Central Bank (ECB), in particular, has a clear 
interest in being able to assess the private 
sector’s short to medium-term inflation 
expectations when conducting its regular broad-
based analysis and assessment of the risks to 
price stability. Information about such 
expectations can, for example, provide evidence 
on the extent to which shocks affecting the 
inflation process are perceived by agents as 
likely to persist or be more short-lived. In 
addition, it is clearly useful to collect 
information on private sector forecasts for 
inflation, as this can serve as a point of 
comparison with – though no replacement for 
– the Eurosystem’s own assessment of the 
inflation outlook. Finally, a key ECB concern is 
also to obtain information that can help assess 
the extent to which private agents hold 
expectations that are in line with the ECB’s 
quantitative definition of its price stability 
objective. Such expectations can help in 
assessing the credibility of the single currency’s 
monetary policy, as perceived by economic 
experts located throughout the European Union 
(EU). To this end, the Survey of Professional 
Forecasters (SPF) also seeks to gather 
information about longer-term expectations for 
the euro area Harmonised Index of Consumer 
Prices (HICP), the price index on which the 
ECB announced its performance would be 
assessed. In order to provide the broader 
macroeconomic context in which professional 
forecasters form their inflation expectations, 
the SPF also collects information on expectations 
for GDP growth and the unemployment rate 
over both long and short horizons, as well as 
probability distributions surrounding the 
forecast point estimates for all three 
macroeconomic variables.
This paper constitutes an initial assessment of 
the information content of the SPF by providing 
a detailed analysis of the survey data collected 
over the period between 1999 and 2006. Given 
that the available sample period is still relatively 
short, the results of this first comprehensive 
assessment of SPF data must be treated with 
some caution. Nonetheless, a number of 
important insights can be obtained based on the 
experience over the last eight years. 
SHORT TO MORE MEDIUM-TERM FORECASTING 
PERFORMANCE
A key result of the analysis presented in this 
paper is that SPF panel members, like most 
other forecasters, have tended to underpredict 
euro area inflation for most of the period since 
1999. However, this result warrants careful 
interpretation. On the one hand, the clear 
tendency for SPF participants to underestimate 
the inflation outcome over one and two-year 
horizons points to the need to exercise a high 
degree of caution when using such expectations 
as a predictor of future inflation. On the other 
hand, our analysis shows that a large part of this 
“systematic” error can be explained by the 
sequence of asymmetric and largely 
unpredictable shocks that hit euro area inflation 
over the period; oil prices, weather-related food 
shocks, unforeseen changes in administered 
prices and indirect taxes. Adjusting for the 
effects of such shocks, there is far less evidence 
of a systematic underprediction or bias in the 
SPF inflation expectations. 
We found much less of a one-sided pattern in 
GDP growth forecast errors. In the early stages 
1    Carroll (2001) cites Keynes (1936) as among the first to 
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of the survey, respondents underestimated the 
strength of GDP growth. However, following 
the slowdown in 2001, GDP growth was then 
consistently overpredicted by respondents; an 
error common to many other forecasters. The 
tendency towards overprediction is most clearly 
evident for the two-year ahead horizon. Finally, 
the pattern of errors in the unemployment rate 
forecasts is somewhat at odds with the errors 
related to GDP. Respondents have tended to 
expect a higher unemployment rate than the 
actual outcome, but if they were to have forecast 
the real side of the economy according to 
Okun’s Law, one would have expected an error 
in the opposite direction. However, once 
account is taken of statistical and methodological 
revisions in the unemployment rate, the 
inconsistency between the unemployment rate 
and GDP growth expectations is substantially 
reduced. Additionally, the effects of labour 
market reforms should be taken into account.
More formal regression tests also provide 
additional evidence of bias in the aggregate 
SPF results. This evidence is strongest for 
inflation expectations and weaker for 
unemployment and GDP growth expectations. 
Importantly, some of these findings may be 
subject to a small sample bias. Using a longer 
sample period, in which the shocks driving 
inflation might be less asymmetric and one-
sided, could reverse this result. Whilst these 
results confirm the need to exercise caution 
when considering the information content of 
the SPF for future macroeconomic outcomes, 
SPF forecasts generally appear to be slightly 
superior to naïve and purely backward-looking 
benchmarks. Lastly, in terms of bias and overall 
predictive accuracy, the SPF performance over 
the period analysed is broadly similar to the 
results of other similar surveys, such as 
Consensus Economics. 
Our analysis of the individual SPF replies 
suggests that the broad pattern of the individual 
forecasts is essentially the same as that of the 
aggregate SPF results. For example, at least 
90% of the panel consistently forecast inflation 
to be below the actual outcome. This may 
reflect a high degree of commonality in the 
information available (and not available) to 
panel members, thus leading them to “get it 
wrong” not only in the aggregate, but also 
individually. A similar pattern is observed for 
both GDP growth and the unemployment rate, 
in the sense that the overall pattern of forecast 
errors is broadly and consistently shared among 
the vast majority of panel members. 
Another cross-sectional feature of the SPF 
panel that we examined was whether there was 
any perceptible difference between the 
performance of panel members from the 
financial sector and the performance of those 
from the non-financial sector. In general, for all 
three macroeconomic variables and all horizons, 
the evidence does not point to any significant 
differences between these two sectors. 
Additionally, there is no evidence that economic 
conditions in the country of the individual panel 
members have had any significant explanatory 
power for their euro area expectations. As a 
final component to our analysis of short to more 
medium-term forecasting performance, we 
investigated whether there are forecasters who 
are systematically better or worse than others. 
The analysis suggests that a small number of 
forecasters consistently perform above average 
for some variables and horizons (although not 
systematically for all variables and all 
horizons). 
FORECAST UNCERTAINTY
The SPF provides several dimensions for 
measuring forecast uncertainty. One may rely 
on information provided by individual point 
estimates only and consider disagreement 
among the forecasters’ views as an indication 
of uncertainty, or one may also make use of the 
probability distributions that each panel member 
assigns to his/her forecast, which is one of the 
SPF’s most original features. Disagreement 
among panel members, simply measured by the 
standard deviation of individual point estimates, 
does not appear to be a good proxy for overall 
macroeconomic uncertainty. Across all 
macroeconomic variables and horizons, the 7
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spread of the cross-sectional distribution is 
rarely sufficiently wide to encompass the actual 
outcome. This suggests some limitations to the 
usefulness of measures of macroeconomic 
uncertainty that are based on the cross-sectional 
distribution of point estimates alone, i.e. a high 
degree of consensus is not necessarily an 
indication of a low level of forecast uncertainty. 
For example, over the period 2001-04, the 
short-term uncertainty about GDP growth, 
measured as the sum of the average variance of 
individual distributions and the variance of 
point estimates, tended to rise and remain high, 
while the level of disagreement among panel 
members actually declined.
More generally, since the start of the SPF, the 
pattern of short-term forecast uncertainty, as 
perceived by SPF respondents, has been broadly 
stable for both inflation and the unemployment 
rate. For GDP growth, however, the SPF has 
indicated a higher degree of variability, as 
reflected in a considerable increase in perceived 
short-term uncertainty over the period 2002-03. 
For both inflation and the unemployment rate, 
risks over the one-year horizon have generally 
been assessed by SPF respondents to be skewed, 
on average, to the upside over the period 
1999-2006. This contrasts with GDP growth 
for which downside risks have tended to 
predominate. 
There are also some indications that panel 
members may not fully internalise the overall 
level of macroeconomic uncertainty. For 
example, compared with the level of uncertainty 
indicated by the historical volatility of the 
actual inflation rate, the perceptions of 
individual panel members indicate a lower level 
of uncertainty. In particular, individual panel 
members tend to give a relatively low weight to 
outcomes further away from the average. While 
this possible underestimation of overall 
inflation uncertainty is much less severe at the 
aggregate level, our evaluation of the aggregate 
SPF density forecasts suggests some evidence 
that respondents failed to accurately assess the 
risk of higher inflation outcomes over this 
period. In addition, SPF respondents may have 
failed to accurately assess the risks of lower 
growth and higher unemployment associated 
with the economic downturn. These conclusions 
suggest a need for caution when using the SPF 
distributions as an indicator of the overall 
uncertainty about the macroeconomic outlook. 
However, it would seem that more definitive 
and robust conclusions must await the 
accumulation of further data. 
LONG-TERM EXPECTATIONS AND UNCERTAINTY
Our analysis of the longer-term expectations in 
the SPF dataset is more descriptive, since such 
expectations cannot be assessed against actual 
realisations. There are, nonetheless, a number 
of findings worth noting. First, a key feature 
that emerges is the clear anchoring of long-term 
inflation expectations at a level in line with 
the definition of price stability adopted by the 
ECB Governing Council. Throughout each of 
the eight years analysed, average long-term 
expectations have remained “below, but close 
to, 2%”, and therefore fully in line with the 
ECB’s quantitative definition of its price 
stability objective. In particular, average long-
term expectations have exhibited considerable 
resilience notwithstanding the persistently 
higher-than-expected inflation outcomes over 
shorter horizons. Rather than revising upward 
their long-term inflation expectations in 
response to the numerous short-run inflation 
shocks, respondents have instead reflected such 
developments in the balance of risks. In line 
with these findings, while there has been a 
significant decline in disagreement about long-
term inflation forecasts among SPF participants, 
uncertainty surrounding each individual 
forecast has tended to increase slightly over 
time. 
At the level of individual panel members, a 
number of other important features also emerge 
from our analysis. First, those individual panel 
members with expectations towards the lower 
end of the cross-sectional distribution (around 
1.5%) have gradually revised upward their 
long-term inflation expectations but nevertheless 
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around 1.8/1.9%). This process has resulted in 
a gradual “narrowing” of the cross-sectional 
distribution of point estimates, implying higher 
consensus that outcomes will be below, but 
close to, 2%. However, another feature of the 
cross-sectional distribution of long-term 
inflation expectations was its “bi-modal” 
nature, giving rise to a relatively high proportion 
of respondents reporting long-term expectations 
of 1.8% and 2.0%. Only a small proportion 
quoted longer-term inflation at 1.9%, although 
this has changed in 2006. The relatively high 
proportion of respondents reporting exactly 
2.0% or slightly above cautions against any 
complacency on the part of the ECB in taking 
its credibility for granted.
Finally, over the longer horizons, our analysis 
of real variables also reveals some interesting 
findings. In particular, long-term GDP 
expectations – which should provide an 
indication of the private sector’s assessment of 
potential growth – have declined over the 
sample period. Moreover, the overall level of 
uncertainty surrounding long-term expectations 
for GDP growth has been assessed by SPF 
respondents to have been quite stable over the 
period 1999-2006, although the balance of risk 
has generally been skewed to the downside. 
The uncertainty surrounding the longer-term 
outlook for the unemployment rate is generally 
assessed to be considerably higher than for 
either inflation or GDP growth. In addition, the 
risks to the longer-term unemployment rate 
expectations have been persistently assessed by 
SPF participants to be on the upside. 
Respondents have linked this to concerns as to 
whether required structural reforms in the 
labour market will be undertaken.9
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1 INTRODUCTION
Around the time of its inception in June 1998, 
the ECB began preparations – in collaboration 
with the national central banks (NCBs) in the 
EU – to establish a survey of the private sector’s 
expectations of future euro area macroeconomic 
developments, in particular inflation. And thus, 
the first SPF took place in the first quarter of 
1999, immediately following the establishment 
of the single currency. Since then, up to the 
fourth quarter of 2006, 32 surveys have been 
carried out on a quarterly basis, thereby 
contributing to the growth of a rich source of 
information on euro area macroeconomic 
forecasts and expectations.2 For a more detailed 
overview of the ECB SPF and its main features, 
see Garcia (2003), which provided a preliminary 
assessment of the SPF. In this paper, based on a 
longer time span of data, we attempt to provide 
a more comprehensive review of the performance 
of the SPF to date.
HISTORY AND MOTIVATION FOR THE SPF
A number of factors underpinned the ECB’s 
wish to initiate the SPF and collect information 
on the macroeconomic expectations and 
forecasts of the private sector. In particular, 
according to mainstream economic theory, 
expectations play a crucial role in influencing 
how the economy functions, as well as how and 
to what extent policy agents, including central 
banks, can influence macroeconomic outcomes. 
At the most fundamental level, this reflects the 
idea that economic agents, both firms and 
households, have strong incentives to make 
their key economic decisions (e.g. consumption, 
investment or price-setting decisions) in a way 
that optimally takes into account the likely 
future developments of the economic variables 
relevant to such decisions. 
In line with the importance of expectations in 
understanding the functioning of the economy, 
the ECB, in particular, had a clear interest in 
being able to assess the private sector’s short to 
medium-term inflation outlook when conducting 
its regular broad-based analysis and assessment 
of the risks to price stability.3 Information about 
such expectations could, for example, provide 
evidence on the extent to which shocks affecting 
the inflation process are perceived by agents as 
likely to persist or to remain more short-lived. 
Indeed, at the start of Stage III of European 
Monetary Union (EMU), the whole topic of 
building forecasts for the euro area 
macroeconomy represented new ground, with 
much uncertainty existing about which 
underlying economic models to adopt and their 
associated parameters. In this context, it was 
deemed useful to collect information on private 
sector forecasts for inflation, as it could serve 
as a point of comparison with – though no 
replacement for – the Eurosystem’s own 
assessment of the inflation outlook. 
In addition, at the start of Stage III of EMU, a 
key concern for the new central bank was to 
obtain information that could help in the 
assessment of the extent to which private agents 
held expectations that were in line with the 
ECB’s quantitative definition of its price 
stability objective. Information on such 
expectations would help in the assessment of 
the credibility of the new single currency’s 
monetary policy, as perceived by economic 
experts located throughout the EU. In this 
respect, the SPF sought to gather information 
about medium to long-term expectations for the 
euro area HICP, the price index on which the 
ECB announced that its performance would be 
assessed. At that time, no other survey measures 
of long-term inflation expectations for the euro 
area HICP were available.4 Lastly, in order to 
2   In this paper, we use the terms “expectations” and “forecasts” 
interchangeably.  
3   Issing (2003) provides an overview of the two-pillar approach 
used by the ECB, in the context of the ECB’s 2003 review of its 
monetary policy strategy. See also ECB (2004a).
4   Since then a number of surveys, such as those conducted by 
Consensus Economics and the Eurozone Barometer, have 
published information on long-term inflation expectations in 
the euro area, defined in terms of the HICP. In the United States, 
the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia has conducted a 
Survey of Professional Forecasters since 1990 – although this 
survey actually dates back to 1968 when it was originally known 
as the ASA/NBER Economic Outlook Survey and was conducted 
by the American Statistical Association (ASA) and the National 
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provide the broader macroeconomic context in 
which professional forecasters formed their 
inflation expectations, the SPF was also used to 
also collect information on expectations for 
both GDP growth and the unemployment rate at 
both long and short horizons. 
MAIN FEATURES OF THE SPF PANEL
In interpreting the results of this study, it is 
important to understand the nature of the SPF 
data. Table 1 provides an overview of the main 
features of the SPF dataset. A number of specific 
features warrant emphasis. First, the survey is 
currently based on a panel of around 75 
forecasters located within the EU.5 The panel 
has been established in close collaboration with 
all the NCBs in the European System of Central 
Banks (ESCB) in order to ensure that 
participating forecasters possess the necessary 
technical expertise. In particular, members of 
the panel are required to possess macroeconomic 
expertise relating to the euro area and not just 
their own national economy. Participants should 
also have several years’ experience in 
forecasting and in publishing forecasts, 
preferably for the euro area economy. Lastly, in 
order to avoid one panel member duplicating 
another, institutions participating in the panel 
are required to be independent, i.e. not closely 
linked to another participant. At present, 
participants are drawn from the 12 euro area 
countries plus the three other EU countries 
(Denmark, Sweden and the United Kingdom) 
that were EU member states at the time of the 
surveys’ inception.6 Following the enlargement 
of the EU in May 2004, the panel was extended 
in principle to include all 25 EU member 
countries, although as yet no new participants 
from these countries have been enrolled.7 
5   Over time, the composition of the panel has altered and the 
number of panellists has tended to decline. Some participants 
have dropped out of the panel, although some have also joined 
it. Moreover, some mergers between several banks in the panel 
have reduced the number of participants. All in all, since the 
beginning of the survey, the panel has decreased from around 90 
to around 75 at the current juncture.
6   Quite considerable variation exists in the number of participants 
across the different EU countries, with Greece having the lowest 
number of participants (1) and Germany the highest (13). 
Among the non-euro area Member States, the United Kingdom 
has the highest number of participants (6) reflecting its pool of 
experienced forecasters in the financial sector. Importantly, in 
setting up the panel, although some degree of correlation may 
be evident, there was no systematic attempt to relate the number 
of respondents located in each country to the “economic weight” 
of the different countries in the EU. Rather, participation was 
mainly determined by the available pool of quality forecasters.
7   At present, there are no panellists from the Member States that 
joined the EU in May 2004, although the NCBs from these 
countries were invited in 2004 to nominate new panellists. The 
main reasons cited for not nominating new panellists were the 
fact that many financial institutions in the new Member States 
were linked with existing panellists (and thus would most likely 
not produce independent forecasts) and that many had not yet 
built up expertise in forecasting euro area developments.
Table 1 Overview of main features of the SPF dataset
1) The rolling horizons are set one and two years ahead of the latest period for which the variable in question is observed when the 
survey is conducted and not one or two years ahead of the survey date.
2) As the EU has been enlarged, the survey has been opened to possible experts from the new Member States. 
Frequency of survey  Quarterly survey conducted in January, April, July, October 
Conducted since Q1 1999
Variables surveyed  – HICP Inflation (in annual percentage change)
– GDP growth (in annual percentage change)
– Unemployment rate (in percentage of the labour force)
Short to more medium-term expectations
 Rolling  horizons 1)





Long-term expectations Five years ahead
Data requested Point estimates and probabilities surrounding point estimates (i.e. density forecasts) 
for all variables and all horizons surveyed 
Number of currently active panel members Around 75
Average number of respondents  59
Geographic domain  EU-wide 2)11
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The average number of respondents in each 
survey round has been 59, although there has 
been a clear seasonal pattern with, on average, 
fewer respondents in the third-quarter round, 
which takes place in July each year. Non-
responses may be due to absences or simply to 
the fact that respondents do not have the time 
to respond when the survey is conducted. The 
window between respondents receiving the 
questionnaire and the deadline for replying is 
quite short and may not always fit in with 
respondents’ own work schedules and forecast 
procedures. Nonetheless, the average number 
of respondents compares quite favourably with 
other euro area surveys, such as Consensus 
Forecasts or the Euro Zone Barometer, which 
have around 30 respondents on average. As an 
EU-wide survey, the aggregate SPF results 
therefore reflect the expectations of agents 
located in countries also outside the euro area.
In terms of its sectoral composition, the SPF 
panel includes participants from the financial 
sector (mostly banks), as well as non-financial 
research institutes and employer or employee 
organisations. The weight of the different 
sectors is primarily “supply driven”, i.e. it 
reflects the supply of high-quality experts in 
the different sectors. In this regard, one feature 
of the panel is that it is heavily weighted 
towards the financial sector, with about half of 
the total panel coming from this sector. In terms 
of the participants from the non-financial sector, 
these are mainly from non-financial research 
institutes, with the representation from social 
partners organisations (either employer or 
employee organisations) being more limited 
(for more details see Garcia, 2003). 
In terms of the information collected, as 
summarised in Table 1, the SPF provides 
information on expectations for euro area HICP 
inflation, GDP growth and the unemployment 
rate over short and more medium to longer-term 
horizons. Over the short horizon, expectations 
are collected for both “rolling” and fixed 
“calendar year” horizons. The rolling horizons 
are set one and two years ahead of the period 
(month or quarter) for which the latest official 
release of a given variable is available. For 
example, in the fourth-quarter SPF for 2006, 
which was conducted in October 2006, the 
latest available HICP data referred to September 
2006. Consequently, respondents were asked to 
report their expectations for the annual rate of 
change in the euro area HICP in September 
2007 and September 2008.8 As regards the 
longer-term horizon, participants are asked to 
provide their expectations for the calendar year 
five years ahead. For example, longer-term 
expectations referred to 2011 in the fourth-
quarter SPF for 2006.
SPF participants are also asked to assign a 
probability distribution to their forecasts. This 
distribution provides information on the 
probability, expressed as a percentage, of the 
future outcome being within a specific range. 
The probability distribution resulting from the 
aggregation of responses also helps to assess 
how, on average, survey participants gauge the 
risk of the actual outcome being above or below 
the most likely range. Moreover, most of the 
participants report a set of underlying 
assumptions regarding the ECB’s main 
refinancing rate, oil price developments and the 
USD/EUR exchange rate for the next five 
quarters. Since the second quarter of 2004, 
participants may also provide quantitative 
labour cost assumptions for the same calendar-
year horizons as for the other main 
macroeconomic variables. Finally, they can 
supplement their replies with a qualitative 
explanation of their survey replies; about a 
third of the panel members choose to do so on 
a regular basis.
FOCUS OF THIS STUDY 
In this study, we seek to provide an initial 
assessment of the data collected in the SPF 
since its inception in early 1999. Considering 
8   Given the difference in the publication lags for euro area GDP, 
inflation and unemployment, the length of the rolling horizon 
(when measured from the survey date) varies across variables. 
Nonetheless, for simplicity, we use the terminology one and 
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the relatively short history of the survey, it is 
still too early to address definitively many 
potentially interesting questions, such as 
whether forecasters are unbiased or whether 
they incorporate new information efficiently, 
etc. Our intention is therefore to highlight some 
of the main features of the information that has 
been collected over the last eight years. 
Correspondingly, we analyse the results of the 
32 surveys conducted between the first quarter 
of 1999 and the fourth quarter of 2006 according 
to the following aspects: 
Short to medium-term forecasting performance: 
Section 2 attempts to assess the ability of the 
surveyed expectations to predict actual future 
outcomes for inflation, GDP growth and the 
unemployment rate. Given the significant 
shocks that have affected the euro area economy 
over the period 1999-2006 (e.g. successive oil 
prices increases, substantial exchange rate 
fluctuations, a global economic slowdown and 
subsequent recovery), it is of interest to assess 
the extent to which panel members have been 
able to accurately predict how such shocks 
would be transmitted to the economy. We 
therefore examine and compare the predictive 
accuracy of the SPF forecasts across different 
variables and horizons. Given the panel 
dimension of the SPF dataset, it is also possible 
to examine the level of heterogeneity in the 
views of the different SPF participants.9 The 
analysis is conducted using standard forecast 
performance statistics (e.g. to check for any 
bias in expectations), as well as more 
sophisticated single equation and panel 
regressions.
Forecast uncertainty: Section 3 of the paper 
considers the information about macroeconomic 
uncertainty that can be extracted from the SPF. 
To capture the main distributional features of 
the surveyed expectations, different indicators 
of aggregate uncertainty are considered and 
compared. We also examine the cross-sectional 
dimension of the dataset, with a view to
assessing the extent to which it can shed light 
on macroeconomic uncertainty. For example, 
we assess the extent of disagreement among 
SPF panel members over time and whether this 
provides a meaningful indication of forecast 
uncertainty. Drawing on recent research that 
has suggested new techniques for evaluating 
the predictive accuracy of density forecasts, we 
also provide a preliminary assessment of the 
extent to which SPF panel members have 
accurately taken into account the level of 
macroeconomic uncertainty when forming their 
expectations. 
Long-term expectations: The final part of our 
analysis focuses on the information about 
longer-term expectations and surrounding 
probability distributions that are available from 
the SPF. Such longer-horizon survey 
expectations do not lend themselves easily to 
evaluation, not least because the number of 
observed outcomes against which the forecasts 
can be assessed is still very low. Therefore, our 
approach is more descriptive. In particular, we 
describe the main insights that can be obtained 
from such indicators. For example, we examine 
the implications of the evolution of longer-term 
inflation expectations for the assessment of the 
credibility of the single monetary policy. In 
addition, to the extent that they may reflect 
private sector views about potential growth or 
the “natural” rate of unemployment, it is also 
insightful to examine the pattern of longer-term 
expectations for GDP growth and the 
unemployment rate. 
9    The possible heterogeneity in the expectations of different 
groups has received growing interest from both policy-makers 
and researchers. For example, the Swedish national central bank 
(Sveriges Riksbank) regularly publishes a table in its Inflation 
Report recording the expectations of seven different groups 
(money market agents, employer organisations, employee 
organisations, purchasing managers in trade, purchasing 
managers in manufacturing, households and firms). For a more 
research-oriented look into the subject, see Carroll (2001). 13
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2  SHORT TO MORE MEDIUM-TERM 
FORECASTING PERFORMANCE
In this section, we assess the short to medium-
term forecasting performance of the SPF to date 
in three main ways. First, we consider the 
standard forecast error summary statistics 
(mean error, root mean squared error, etc). 
Second, we undertake some statistical tests for 
unbiasedness. In assessing the results of this 
analysis, it should be borne in mind that the 
period under consideration (first quarter of 
1999 to the fourth quarter of 2006) is relatively 
short and one in which there have been a 
considerable number of shocks to the euro area 
economy (e.g. oil price shocks, food price 
shocks, etc). Third, in addition to considering 
the performance of the aggregate SPF forecasts, 
we investigate individual SPF forecasts and 
forecasts for different (national and institutional) 
sub-groups of the SPF in order to check whether 
or not the aggregate forecasts are masking 
significant differences at a more detailed 
level. 
As highlighted in Section 1, SPF respondents 
are asked to provide forecasts for two types of 
horizons: rolling horizons and calendar-year 
horizons. The rolling horizons in the SPF are 
one year and two years ahead of the latest data 
available when the survey is carried out. Rolling 
horizons have two advantages. First, they allow 
for an assessment of the dynamic pattern of the 
forecast variables within a particular horizon, 
which may be hidden by considering only 
calendar-year forecasts, and second, they 
provide a larger number of forecasts that can be 
assessed against the actual outcome than 
allowed for by considering only calendar-year 
horizons.10 However, these rolling horizons 
cannot be considered “independent” forecasts, 
as their associated forecast errors partly 
overlap.11 Consequently, a shock to the variable 
being forecast affects the forecast errors for 
several forecast rounds and not just one. Given 
the larger number of outcomes for the rolling 
horizon forecasts, this section focuses on these 
horizons, although some information is reported 
on calendar-year horizons as they allow for a 
comparison with other private sector forecasts.
2.1  FORECAST PERFORMANCE STATISTICS FOR 
THE AGGREGATE SPF
There are a number of standard statistics 
typically used for evaluating forecasting 
performance.12 These statistics are (1) the mean 
error (ME), (2) the mean absolute error (MAE), 
(3) the root mean squared error (RMSE), and 
(4) Theil’s U statistic (U). Box 1 provides 
further information on each of these statistics, 
as well as a brief discussion on their uses and 
limitations.
10  An advantage of the calendar-year horizons is that they allow 
for comparison with other surveys of private sector expectations 
and forecasts reported by international organisations. 
Conversely, at present, the number of calendar-year horizons for 
which data realisations are available is still very small. Since 
the SPF started in 1999, only eight full calendar years have 
elapsed.
11   For example, in the first quarter of 2005, SPF forecasters 
provided a forecast of annual inflation for December 2005, and 
in the second quarter of 2005, for March 2006. The time periods 
of the two forecasts overlap, as they both include price changes 
in the period from March 2005 to December 2005. If some 
shock were to occur during this overlapping period (say a rise 
in oil prices), it is likely that inflation would rise sharply, with 
the result that the forecasts for December 2005 and March 2006 
would be too low. For a more conceptual discussion of the 
problems raised by overlapping data, see Harri and Brorsen 
(2002).
12  See Timmermann (2006) for a recent and concise review of 
forecast evaluation criteria and an application to the IMF’s 
World Economic Outlook forecasts.
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Box 1
SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR ASSESSING FORECASTING PERFORMANCE
The mean error (ME) is calculated as the average difference between the forecast value Ft and 











If the forecasts are unbiased and shocks are symmetric, then the ME should be zero on average. 
However, if the economy has been subject to a number of one-sided shocks (for example, strong 
and persistent unexpected increases in oil prices), the ME is unlikely to be close to zero over 
short time periods. A positive value for the ME indicates that, on average, over the whole run 
of forecasts, the actual value of a particular variable was underestimated, i.e. the forecasts were 
too low. A negative ME, on the other hand, indicates, that the forecasts were too high on 
average. One disadvantage of the ME statistic is that it averages out positive and negative 
errors. Thus, it is possible that two forecasters could have the same mean error, but that one 
could make larger positive and negative errors on average. As a result, the ME statistic only 
provides limited information on the overall accuracy of the forecast.
The mean absolute error (MAE) statistic overcomes this shortcoming by calculating the average 
of the absolute errors. Thus, the MAE statistic gives information on the average size of forecast 










The MAE statistic is not without shortcomings either. Consider, in particular, the viewpoint of 
a policy-maker using forecasts as a decision guide. It is possible, for example, if there are non-
linearities, that one or two forecasts that are very far from the actual outcomes could be more 
damaging from a policy viewpoint than a larger number of forecasts that are only a small 
distance from the actual outcomes. If this is the case, the policy-maker would like an error 
statistic that penalises outliers. The root mean squared error (RMSE) statistic, which squares 
errors before averaging them, thus provides an alternative measure of forecast accuracy. 
Considering two forecasters with the same average absolute error, the RMSE statistic more 
heavily penalises the forecaster who makes some large errors compared with the forecaster who 











An additional forecast statistic that may be considered is Theil’s U statistic, which compares 
the RMSE error of a forecast against a benchmark forecast of a random walk – what we will 
refer to as a “naïve” forecast (which takes the “current” value of the forecast variable).1 The 
idea behind this statistic is that although a forecast may look good relative to other forecasts, 
it could be that simply assuming that the forecast is equal to the last available value could 
produce a better forecast. Indeed, this is quite often the case for variables such as exchange 
rates and oil prices. 
1  In this note, Theil’s U statistic is calculated as the ratio of the RMSE of the aggregate SPF forecast to the RMSE of the “naïve” 
alternative forecast. A value greater than one means that the “naïve” forecast performs better.15
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Table 2 reports the main forecast error summary 
statistics for inflation, real GDP growth and the 
unemployment rate, looking at the rolling 
horizons (one-year and two-year ahead).
Considering first the results for inflation, the 
ME statistic indicates that inflation has tended 
to be underestimated over both the one and 
two-year ahead horizons. This is not so 
surprising, as HICP inflation since 1999 has 
been affected by a number of upward shocks 
(oil price increases in 1999-2000 and 2004-06, 
unprocessed food price shocks linked to BSE 
and foot-and-mouth disease in 2001, unexpected 
increases in administered prices and indirect 
taxes). The one-year ahead rolling annual 
inflation forecast underestimated inflation by 
0.5 percentage point on average, as indicated 
by the ME. The underestimation was fairly 
consistent over time (i.e. there were not many 
offsetting positive and negative forecast errors) 
since the MAE is broadly similar at 0.5 
percentage point. The RMSE, at 0.6 percentage 
point is slightly larger, indicating some, albeit 
not much, variability in the size of errors across 
survey rounds. More strikingly, although one 
may expect RMSEs to increase along forecast 
horizons, given that it is more difficult to make 
accurate forecasts over longer horizons, the 
RMSE for two-year ahead inflation forecasts is 
slightly smaller than that for one year ahead. 
Overall, the results confirm the particular 
difficulty that SPF forecasters encountered in 
foreseeing the cluster of temporary shocks to 
inflation since 1999. 
In contrast to the inflation forecasts, both one and 
two-year ahead real GDP growth rates tended to 
be overestimated by an average of 0.1 percentage 
point and 0.8 percentage point respectively 
according to the ME. The lower one-year ahead 
ME statistic conceals fairly large errors, both 
positive and negative, since the MAE equals 
0.9 percentage point, as well as some limited 
variability in the size of the errors, as the RMSE 
is only slightly larger than the MAE.
At first glance, the average overestimation of the 
unemployment rate (0.5 percentage point for the 
one-year ahead horizon) is at odds with the 
overestimation of GDP growth. Based on Okun’s 
law, a negative relationship would normally be 
expected between GDP growth and unemployment. 
However, the large overestimation of the 
unemployment rate is mainly an artefact from 
downward revisions to the unemployment data, 
which were particularly large in 2000 and 2001.13 
Table 2 SPF forecast errors (Q1 1999 to Q4 2006 survey rounds): summary statistics 
(annual percentage change unless otherwise indicated)
Inflation Real GDP Unemployment 1)
Sample statistics
Actual value
 Mean  (1999-2006 2)) 2.1 2.0 8.4
  Standard deviation (in p.p.) 0.5 1.2 0.5
Forecast error statistics 1-year ahead 2-years ahead 1-year ahead 2-years ahead 1-year ahead 2-years ahead
Forecast value
 Mean 1.7 1.8 2.1 2.4 8.7 8.4
  Standard deviation (in p.p.) 0.2 0.1 0.6 0.3 0.7 0.6
ME (in p.p.) 0.5 0.4 -0.1 -0.8 -0.5 -0.1
MAE (in p.p.) 0.5 0.5 0.9 1.1 0.6 0.7
RMSE (in p.p.) 0.6 0.5 1.0 1.3 0.8 0.9
Theil’s U 0.9 0.7 0.7 0.8 1.4 1.1
Sources: ECB, Eurostat and ECB calculations.
1) As a percentage of the labour force.
2) Q3 2006
13  One should also consider the impact of structural reforms in the 
labour market.
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These revisions mostly reflect statistical changes 
that could not have been predicted. Using the 
data available at the time the forecasts were 
realised, the average root mean square forecast 
error is reduced substantially from 0.5 percentage 
point to 0.1 percentage point. The influence of 
statistical and methodological changes on 
forecast performance highlights one of the pitfalls 
in forecast evaluation, particularly when there 
are only a small number of realised forecasts. 
However, the impact of data revision is much less 
significant for inflation and GDP growth 
forecasts.
On average, one-year ahead forecasts are more 
accurate than two-year ahead forecasts, apart 
from in the case of inflation, where they appear 
to be more or less comparable. Table 2 also 
reports an SPF Theil’s U statistic of below 1 for 
both the one and two-year inflation and real 
GDP growth horizons. This suggests that SPF 
forecasts for inflation and GDP growth are 
more accurate than a naïve forecast and that 
SPF replies contain information about the 
future, beyond what is already contained in the 
most recent data.14 
Chart 1 plots the detailed forecast errors for 
inflation, which have been clearly and 
persistently positive over the sample period, 
with the exception of the observation for the 
fourth quarter of 2006. In interpreting this 
result, it should be recalled that the period since 
1999 has been characterised by a cluster of 
large (and generally one-sided) shocks to 
inflation. The most significant of these have 
been oil and non-oil commodity price 
developments, large exchange rate movements, 
food price shocks associated with animal health 
concerns and weather conditions, the euro cash 
changeover and significant changes to 
administered prices and indirect taxes. It is 
therefore insightful to consider each of these 
factors and their correlation with the forecast 
errors in more detail. 
Inflation forecast errors, in particular, appear to 
be correlated with oil price movements. For 
example, oil price increases in 1999-2000, 
reinforced by exchange rate movements, 
contributed to a rise in headline inflation that 
translated into substantial forecast errors. The 
forecast errors were particularly large in the 
second half of 2000, illustrating the persistence 
of errors over several survey rounds. Similarly, 
in 2001, overall inflation was heavily influenced 
by movements in volatile price components, in 
particular unprocessed food prices, driven up 
by health concerns related to BSE and the 
Chart 1 One and two-year ahead inflation forecasts
One-year ahead Two-year ahead
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14  We tested this hypothesis further using Granger causality tests, 
which are a more rigorous test of predictive content, but the 
results did not confirm evidence that survey forecasts had 
predictive content for future developments. Such a result may 
be due to the small sample size, however.
Sources: ECB, Eurostat and ECB calculations.17
ECB 
Occasional Paper No 59
April 2007
outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease in a number 
of euro area countries. The measures taken to 
prevent the diseases spreading further (culls, 
export bans, etc.) exerted further upward 
pressures on meat prices, which contributed 
significantly to an unanticipated pick-up in 
headline inflation. Consequently, forecast 
errors in 2001 were also relatively high 
compared with the average. In the first half of 
2004, SPF forecast errors were once again quite 
large. This reflected increases in administered 
prices (e.g. related to the German health care 
reform) that were decided upon and announced 
in late 2003. All in all, it seems that the 
persistent underestimation of euro area inflation 
by SPF forecasters is very much related to the 
series of unanticipated upward shocks to 
inflation that has occurred since 1999. As 
different shocks impacted at different times, it 
is difficult to disentangle the different factors 
graphically. Nonetheless, the impact of oil price 
developments, food prices and the impact of 
government measures on inflation forecast 
errors over the one-year horizon is clear.15 As 
many of these shocks were difficult to predict, 
this analysis puts into context the observed 
persistent underestimation of inflation. 
Chart 2 below plots the series for one and two-
year ahead GDP growth forecast errors over the 
sample period.16 With the forecast errors being 
mainly negative since early 2001, GDP growth 
expectations have also been somewhat one-
sided, although less so than inflation. 
In this regard, GDP growth may have been less 
asymmetrically affected by shocks during the 
period under consideration. Particularly at the 
beginning of the period, GDP appears to have 
been subject to some favourable shocks. SPF 
forecasters underestimated output growth in 
2000. This may have been due to the positive 
impact of the exchange rate depreciation on 
exports combined with the fact that the adverse 
effects of 1998’s emerging economy crisis on 
the global economy appeared to have been more 
limited and short-lived than expected. For most 
of the period since 2001, however, SPF 
forecasters have overestimated GDP growth. 
15    This assessment is also confirmed by an econometric 
investigation that sought to link the forecast errors with (1) the 
annual rate of change in oil prices, (2) the annual rate of change 
in unprocessed food prices and (3) the impact of government 
measures on HICP inflation. In each case, a positive and 
significant relationship was found with the forecast error.
16  Compared with inflation, data for GDP growth are much more 
affected by publication lags. Hence, whilst the GDP forecasts 
are referred to as the one and two-year ahead forecasts, it is 
important to note that they, in fact, refer to four and eight 
quarters ahead of the latest data observation for GDP growth. 
Given the data publication lags involved, this means that 
forecasters actually have as much as five months worth of 
relevant information (such as industrial production or survey 
data) and this may give some insight into GDP developments. 
Hence, in reality, the forecasts for GDP growth may be more 
like two and six-quarter ahead forecasts. When comparing 
forecast performance across variables, it is important to keep 
these differences in mind. 
Chart 2 One and two-year ahead forecasts of real GDP growth
One-year ahead Two-year ahead
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Sources: ECB, Eurostat and ECB calculations.18
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This might be explained by the clustering of 
unexpected adverse shocks which heightened 
uncertainty and reduced the magnitude of 
output growth. In 2000 and 2001, the protracted 
increase in oil prices impacted negatively on 
consumption and investment. Moreover, the 
deterioration in the external environment of the 
euro area, stemming mainly from the United 
States, curtailed growth of euro area exports 
and investment. At the end of 2001, the terrorist 
attacks in the United States on 11 September 
were a further blow to business and consumer 
confidence. In addition, the sharp fall in equity 
prices, the continued decline in confidence and 
the geo-political tensions in the run-up to the 
Iraq war contributed to a further two years of 
disappointing real GDP growth performance.
Finally, at first glance, unemployment also appears 
to have been strongly overestimated in 2000 (by 
around 1.5 percentage points), but this is largely 
an artefact from downward revisions to the 
unemployment rate. As these revisions mostly 
reflect statistical changes that could not have been 
predicted, Chart 3 reports the forecast errors using 
unrevised data (i.e. first estimates). The average 
forecast error is then substantially reduced, 
especially for one-year ahead forecasts. The 
profile of the unemployment forecasts mirrors 
the downward movement observed in the 
unemployment rate between 1997 and 2001, which 
reflected a combination of cyclical and structural 
factors (such as an increasing incidence of part-
time work, structural reforms in the labour market, 
etc.) and the broad levelling-off thereafter.17 
2.2  TESTING FOR BIAS IN THE SPF
We can further assess the accuracy of SPF 
predictions by presenting statistical tests for 
the unbiasedness of the forecasts. Unbiasedness 
implies that forecast errors are zero on average.18 
17  For a recent overview of longer-term perspectives on structural 
unemployment in the euro area, see ECB (2005b).
18  As a rule, if forecasts are in line with the Rational Expectation 
Hypothesis (REH) formulated by Muth (1961), they should be 
unbiased. The REH states that market participants use all cost-
efficient knowledge to forecast economic variables so that their 
forecasts will tend to be unbiased and efficient. Efficiency 
requires that the forecasts use all relevant information available 
at the time that they were made. Tests for efficiency include 
checking the forecast errors for (lack of) serial correlation and 
orthogonality tests (whether the forecast errors are independent 
of the information set used in making the forecast). An additional 
and related property of rational forecasts is consistency 
(i.e. each forecast reflects only new information available since 
the last forecast). However, due to the overlapping nature of the 
forecasts, neither efficiency nor consistency are tested here as 
the sample is still too small to obtain robust results. 
Chart 3 One and two-year ahead forecasts of the unemployment rate
(using real-time data1))
One-year ahead Two-year ahead
Sources: ECB, Eurostat and ECB calculations.
1) To control for the impact of data revisions, we show in the chart the first vintage (or release) of unemployment data. For example, 
unemployment data released in January 2002 for November 2001 reported an unemployment rate of 8.5%. However, the current 
estimate of unemployment in November 2001 is 7.9%, approximately 0.6 percentage point below the initial estimate. These revisions 
may be due to changes in methodology or additional more complete data becoming available subsequent to the initial estimate.
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The standard test of unbiasedness is to test the 
joint hypothesis α = 0 and β = 1 in (1) using an 
F-statistic:
AF tt t =+ + αβ ε    (1)
where Ft is the forecast and At the actual realised 
value. If we cannot reject the null hypothesis, 
we can conclude that the forecast is unbiased. 
Holden and Peel (1990) proposed a further test 
for unbiasedness that is performed directly on 
the forecast errors and tests whether μ is equal 
to 0 in (2):19
AF tt t −= + µε     (2)
Table 3 reports the results of tests applied to 
equations (1) and (2) for SPF aggregate 
forecasts. The probability values of the 
F-statistic for most variables tested are 
extremely low and unbiasedness is generally 
rejected (i.e. evidence of bias is found). 
However, it should be noted that the point 
estimates for α and β are difficult to interpret. 
Hence, equation (2) may be a better test. The 
last column of Table 3 reports the probability 
values for the t-statistic testing whether μ is 
equal to 0. We still find strong evidence that 
SPF inflation forecasts are biased. This is not 
surprising considering inflation forecasts have 
always been significantly below actual inflation 
since the beginning of the survey. Looking at 
GDP growth, it seems that only two-year ahead 
forecasts are biased, while growth forecasts for 
one-year ahead appear to be unbiased. Finally, 
turning to unemployment, we can reject the 
joint hypothesis α = 0 and β = 1 for all forecast 
horizons. However, we cannot reject that the 
mean of the forecast error for unemployment 
two years ahead is zero. Overall, the statistical 
evidence is quite weak and not fully robust 
owing to the small number of observations. 
It is useful to amend equations (1) and (2) in 
order to investigate whether the results obtained 
are sensitive to the cluster of unanticipated 
exogenous shocks that would generate large 
outliers in the observed forecast errors. A formal 
way to investigate and confirm this assumption 
would have been to use dummies for each 
identified shock, but this would have 
considerably reduced an already very small 
sample. To circumvent the issue, we ran bias 
tests, replacing overall HICP inflation by HICP 
excluding energy and unprocessed food, and run 
the same regressions as in Table 3. Although 
SPF forecasters never intended to forecast HICP 
excluding energy and unprocessed food, this 
artifice can be seen as an alternative to shock 
dummies to the extent that many of the shocks 
between 1999 and 2006 affected energy and 
unprocessed food prices. Table 4 provides the 
results of the bias tests from these regressions. 
Table 3 Regression tests for bias in the SPF aggregate forecasts
Source: ECB calculations.
Note: Calculated using actual outcomes during the period 1999-2006. Standard errors are in brackets (corrected using the Newey-West 
procedure). The p-value is from the F-test; coloured figures indicates rejection of unbiasedness at the 10% level or lower. 
1) Indicates that the coefficient is significantly different from the null hypothesis (i.e. α = 0 or β = 1) at the 10% level or lower. 
Variable αβ R2 F-test (p-value) μ (p-value)
Inflation one year ahead 1.06 (0.38) 1) 0.68 (0.22) 0.16 0.000 0.000
Inflation two years ahead 3.74 (0.92) 1) -0.86 (0.53) 1) 0.09 0.000 0.000
GDP growth one year ahead -0.33 (0.59) 1.09 (0.34) 0.29 0.722 0.646
GDP growth two years ahead 4.10 (1.64) 1) -0.98 (0.65) 1) 0.08 0.001 0.005
Unemployment one year ahead 7.79 (1.05) 1) 0.07 (0.11) 0.01 0.000 0.065
Unemployment two years ahead 11.82 (0.78) 1) -0.40 (0.09) 1) 0.45 0.000 0.824
19  As forecasts are made for horizons that are longer than the 
frequency of forecast rounds (i.e. one-year ahead forecasts vs 
quarterly rounds), the estimated residuals (εt) are serially 
correlated. As a result, the standard errors of the estimated 
coefficients will be underestimated and the t-statistics, 
overestimated. They therefore need to be corrected for any 
inference to be drawn from the F-tests. We used the Newey-
West variance estimator to perform this correction. 
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As suspected, although the estimated coefficients 
differ from the theoretical values predicted by 
the assumptions of unbiasedness, we find that 
there would be less of a bias if the HICP 
excluding energy and unprocessed food prices 
is used. This suggests the unprocessed food and 
energy price shocks to inflation explain a large 
part of the downward bias visible in SPF 
replies.20
The above tests suggest evidence of a statistically 
significant bias in the aggregate SPF results. 
However, testing for bias in the aggregate results 
does not take account of the individual micro 
dimension to the SPF dataset. In particular, it has 
been shown that running tests at the aggregate 
level can introduce a potentially severe 
aggregation bias in the results (see for example, 
Keane and Runkle, 1990). Annex 1 therefore 
considers the results of tests for bias using the 
full panel of SPF data, thereby enhancing the test 
by taking into account the full set of cross-
sectional information in the dataset. The analysis 
shows that using a panel of individual forecasts 
reveals an even more significant bias than the 
aggregate results would suggest. Consequently, 
these results generally highlight the widespread 
difficulty that even professional forecasters had 
in making accurate forecasts under recent 
macroeconomic conditions.
2.3  COMPARING SPF AND CONSENSUS 
ECONOMICS FORECASTS
Given the short period of time for which SPF 
forecast errors are available, it is difficult to 
assess to what extent the observed bias is due to 
poor forecasting or the occurrence of persistently 
unpredictable events over the sample period. In 
this context, it is also useful to consider the 
relative forecasting performance of the SPF 
compared with other forecasters. Such a 
comparison can reveal whether or not the 
members of the SPF were poor at forecasting per 
se or whether their errors were shared with 
others. If the latter is the case, this could suggest 
that specific shocks or structural changes that 
were difficult to foresee were behind the SPF 
forecast errors rather than a poor absolute 
performance on the part of SPF panel members. 
The SPF forecasts can be assessed against a 
comparable benchmark, i.e. the averages of 
private sector forecasts published by Consensus 
Economics.21 We consider the results from the 
SPF and Consensus Economics January surveys 
every year and compare forecasts for the current 
and the following calendar year. Two small 
Table 4 Regression tests for bias in the SPF aggregate inflation forecasts
(Dependent variable: HICP excluding unprocessed food and energy prices)
Variable αβ R2 F-test (p-value) μ (p-value)
Inflation one year ahead -0.72 (1.04) 1.50 (0.61) 0.22 0.492 0.413
Inflation two years ahead 0.94 (1.62) 0.56 (0.92) 0.02 0.401 0.212
Source: ECB calculations. 
Note: Calculated using actual outcomes during the period 1999-2006. Standard errors are in brackets (corrected using the Newey-West 
procedure). The p-value is from the F-test.
20  We also checked whether data revisions may have impacted the 
findings by using real-time data (i.e. initially released data) at 
each point, instead of what the latest data vintages indicate. This 
did not change the results significantly, although it slightly 
weakened the finding of unbiased growth forecasts one year 
ahead and suggested that unemployment rate forecasts were 
unbiased when compared with the initially released data.
21  Every month since 1989, Consensus Economics has published 
forecasts for major economic variables prepared by a panel of 
10 to 30 private sector forecasters, initially for the G7 countries 
and subsequently for over 70 other economies. The forecasts are 
published in the second week of each month, based on a survey 
of panellists’ forecasts in the previous two weeks. Together with 
the individual forecasts for each variable, Consensus Economics 
also publishes their arithmetic average, the so-called “consensus 
forecast”, for that variable. These predictions relate to the 
current year and the following year. They can thus be directly 
compared with the calendar year aggregate forecasts provided 
with the SPF results, using January forecasts for the current year 
(t) and the following calendar year (t+1) from both datasets. In 
interpreting the comparison between the SPF and Consensus 
Economics, it should be borne in mind that the two surveys 
share some common panel members. 21
ECB 
Occasional Paper No 59
April 2007
differences need to be highlighted. First, 
Consensus Economics has only been reporting 
euro area figures since January 2003. Prior to 
this date, Consensus forecasts correspond to the 
aggregation of euro area country forecasts. 
Second, unlike the SPF, Consensus forecasts 
may reflect Consumer Prices Indices (CPI) and 
not specifically HICPs. Table 5 shows statistics 
on average mean errors and RMSEs for HICP 
inflation and real GDP growth for the current 
calendar year and the following calendar year. 
It is important to note that there are only a small 
number of outcomes against which to compare 
forecasts (seven for the current calendar year 
forecast and six for the following calendar year 
forecast).22 Overall, Table 5 shows that both 
Consensus Economics and the SPF provide 
comparable forecasts in terms of accuracy.23
Looking at the current calendar year inflation 
forecast and the following calendar year GDP 
growth forecast, the SPF appears to perform 
marginally better than Consensus Economics. 
However, this is due primarily to rounding 
differences. On the other hand, although the 
error statistics for the following calendar year 
inflation forecast appears the same, in fact the 
Consensus Economic forecasts perform 
marginally better than the SPF to the second 
decimal point. In any case, such small 
differences in forecast performance when 
making comparisons over such a short period 
mean that the differences between Consensus 
Economics and SPF results are not statistically 
significant. Moreover, RMSE results show that 
both surveys slightly outperform a naïve 
forecast. Overall, it is clear from this comparison 
that participants in the SPF did no worse than 
many other forecasters over the period. 
2.4 HETEROGENEITY  AND  INDIVIDUAL 
FORECAST PERFORMANCE
The analysis above focused on the aggregate SPF 
results. These results can conceal considerable 
heterogeneity among the respondents. In this 
section, we focus on the forecast heterogeneity and, 
in particular, on whether taking into account this 
heterogeneity can provide additional insight beyond 
that provided by the aggregate numbers.
SUMMARISING INDIVIDUAL FORECASTS
Given the large number of respondents to the 
SPF, summarising the individual responses in a 
manageable way is not straightforward. Box-
whisker charts are one useful way of depicting 
and summarising the heterogeneity among 
individual respondents in the context of a 
survey such as the SPF. Each box-whisker plot 
contains summary information about the 
individual replies, as illustrated in Box 2. 
22  Results for the unemployment rate are not reported, as prior to 
January 2003 Consensus Economics only reported forecasts for 
the three largest euro area economies.
23  The same exercise could have been carried out using Euro Zone 
Barometer survey results, but the euro area forecasts have only 
been available since 2002.




Table 5 Forecast errors (SPF, Consensus Economics)
(January surveys)
Current calendar year (t) Following calendar year (t+1)
Inflation
Mean error RMSE Mean error RMSE
SPF 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.5
Consensus Economics 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.5
Naïve forecast 0.2 0.4 0.3 0.7
Real GDP growth
Mean error RMSE Mean error RMSE
SPF -0.1 0.7 -0.7 1.3
Consensus Economics -0.1 0.7 -0.8 1.4
Naïve forecast -0.2 1.0 -0.4 1.5
Sources: Consensus Economics and ECB calculations.22
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Chart 4 presents box-whisker plots for one and 
two-year ahead inflation forecasts. The broad 
pattern of the individual forecasts is essentially 
the same as that of the average SPF results. 
Considering first of all the one-year ahead 
forecast, it is clear that the vast majority of SPF 
panellists underestimated inflation. Even though 
the range between the 90th and 10th percentiles 
was 0.63 percentage point on average (the 
average inter-quartile range was 0.33 percentage 
point), for the period under consideration, the 
actual outcome lay outside even the 90th 
percentile for much of the time (22 out of 28 
realised values lay outside the 90th percentile). 
Only in the fourth quarter of 2006 was the actual 
outcome below the median (50th percentile). 
Thus, although the individual SPF forecasts 
exhibited substantial heterogeneity, the actual 
outcome was systematically above the majority 
of panellists’ forecasts.
In the macroeconomic literature, a positive 
correlation between the level and the variance 
of inflation has frequently been found;24 this 
Box 2
INTERPRETING THE BOX-WHISKER CHART
Both the mean and the median of the SPF point estimates are presented in the box-whisker 
chart. The median is the point forecast with exactly half of the panel members above and half 
below. Differences between the mean and the median of the point estimates might indicate the 
presence of outliers in one direction, as well as potential future changes. For example, in 
response to a shock or new information, it could be that, initially, only a number of forecasters 
change their point forecasts, which could, although not necessarily, have a bigger impact on 
the mean than on the median. If all other forecasters were to incorporate this information in the 
subsequent rounds, this would result in changes in the aggregate forecast that might be signalled 
by movements in the mean relative to the median. 
In addition, the “inter-quartile” range of forecasts is indicated by the extremities of the box. 
The inter-quartile range depicts the range between the 25th and the 75th percentile in the 
distribution of point estimates. This is often considered as a useful summary measure of the 
dispersion of point estimates as it is not affected so much by outliers or extreme values. 
The “whiskers” represent the 10th and 90th 
percentile of the distribution of the point 
estimates. These provide additional 
information on the spread of point estimates 
and, hence, on the level of disagreement 
among panel members. In particular, the size 
of the whiskers relative to the box can provide 
some insight into the share of forecasters with 
expectations that are some distance away from 
the “middle ground”. Lastly, where available, 
we plot the actual data outcome for comparison 
purposes.
24   See for example, Golob (1994) for US data, Crawford and 
Kasumovich (1996) for Canadian data or Kontonikas (2004) for 
UK data. Note, however, that these studies generally consider 
the relationship between inflation and inflation uncertainty over 
long periods of time (from the 1970s onwards) and can thus 
cover different inflation regimes. Our sample is limited to a 
period of relatively low and stable inflation.
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could lead to the a priori expectation that there 
is a positive relationship between the dispersion 
of inflation forecasts and the mean forecast.25 
However, the correlation between the mean of 
the forecasts and the dispersion of the forecasts 
(as measured either by the inter-quartile range 
or the range between the 90th and 10th 
percentiles) has been negative. This may reflect 
the impact of common shocks observed over 
the period; for example, an increase in oil prices 
should affect individual forecasts in the same 
direction, thus increasing the mean but not 
necessarily the dispersion of forecasts.
Turning to the two-year ahead forecasts, once 
again inflation was invariably underestimated 
by a large majority of forecasters. The inter-
quartile range (at 0.29 percentage point) and 
the range between the 90th and 10th percentiles 
(at 0.55 percentage point) turn out to be slightly 
lower than those for the one-year ahead 
forecasts. At first glance, this might appear 
somewhat surprising, as one might expect the 
range of estimates to increase over longer 
horizons. However, this lower level of 
dispersion and variability in the two-year ahead 
forecasts suggests that they are relatively 
anchored, in line with the view that monetary 
policy can play a role in stabilising inflation 
over this horizon. Furthermore, the dispersion 
of point estimates once again does not appear 
to be positively correlated with the mean of the 
point estimates.
Turning to the GDP forecasts, the average value 
of the inter-quartile range for one-year ahead 
GDP forecasts was 0.40 percentage point, which 
is somewhat larger than that for inflation over the 
same horizon. This indicates a larger dispersion 
of GDP growth forecasts. Similarly, the range 
between the 90th and 10th percentiles was 0.79 
percentage point on average, also above the range 
recorded for inflation. The respective ranges for 
two-year ahead GDP forecasts were 0.35 
percentage point and 0.71 percentage point, 
which are both smaller than the one-year ahead 
forecast. Whilst the actual value was frequently 
outside the range of the 90th to 10th percentiles 
for one-year ahead forecasts this was, unlike for 
inflation, both on the upside and the downside. 
By contrast, over the period for which data are 
available, the actual outcome has tended to be 
below the 10th percentile for the two-year ahead 
GDP forecasts, with the exception of the first and 
more recently realised outcomes. Lastly, and 
again similar to the inflation forecasts, the 
correlation between both the inter-quartile and 
Chart 4 Box-whiskers plots of inflation forecasts (rolling horizons) 
One-year ahead Two-year ahead









































25  See for example, Kiley (2000) and D’Amico and Orphanides 
(2006). 
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90th to 10th percentile ranges and the mean was 
negative for one-year ahead GDP. It was positive, 
but close to, zero for the two-year ahead GDP 
growth forecasts. It is also worth noting for the 
two-year ahead forecasts that the mean of GDP 
forecasts has been, on average, below the median, 
which implies that the distribution of point 
estimates was skewed to the downside (see 
Chart 5).  
Lastly, turning to the unemployment forecasts, 
unlike the inflation and GDP forecasts, both the 
inter-quartile and the 90th to 10th percentile 
ranges increase as the forecast horizon increases 
(see Chart 6). The former was 0.30 percentage 
point on average for one-year ahead forecasts 
and 0.43 percentage point for two-year ahead 
forecasts. The corresponding values for the 90th 
to 10th percentile ranges were 0.57 percentage 
point and 0.87 percentage point. The fact that the 
ranges increase as the forecast horizon increases 
most likely reflects the “non-stationary” nature 
of the unemployment rate. In other words, both 
inflation and GDP growth tend to be relatively 
“stationary” in that they tend to return to a 
certain range as they are anchored by monetary 
policy and the rate of growth of potential output, 
respectively.26 On the other hand, the 
unemployment rate may move either up or down 
on a more permanent basis, as has been observed 
over the past four decades.27 There was also a 
small positive correlation between the ranges 
and the mean forecast, unlike for inflation and 
GDP. In particular, the downward movement in 
the unemployment rate forecast over the period 
was associated with a growing consensus on the 
unemployment outlook. 
INDIVIDUAL FORECAST PERFORMANCE
It may also be interesting to consider the 
heterogeneity of forecast performance in terms 
of the individual RMSEs of panel members. 
The results reported in Table 6 show considerable 
variation in terms of forecast accuracy. For 
example, in the case of inflation one year ahead, 
the worst forecaster has an RMSE that is more 
than twice that of the best forecaster. A similar 
difference across forecasters is observed for 
other variables and horizons, with the spread 
between the best and worst forecaster being 
smallest for one-year ahead GDP. However, 
some caution is warranted when ranking 
forecasters based on such a small number of 
Chart 5 Box-whisker plots for real GDP growth forecasts (rolling horizons)
One-year ahead Two-year ahead
Sources: ECB, Eurostat and ECB calculations.
























































26  Both the ECB and the European Commission have communicated 
extensively on their estimates of potential growth, which may 
have helped to anchor SPF respondents’ longer-term growth 
expectations. See, for example, ECB (2005a) and European 
Commission (2006). 
27  Whilst these movements, in the first instance, reflect cyclical 
factors, structural features of the labour market determine the 
persistence of these movements (see Blanchard 1997).25
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observations. For example, the “best” ranked 
forecaster for two-year ahead GDP (who 
nevertheless had a considerable RMSE of 1.1 
percentage point) was the most pessimistic, and 
although ex post it seems that such pessimism 
may have been warranted, this may not have 
been the case ex ante, given the unforeseen 
shocks that occurred during the period. 
Similarly, the “best” forecaster of the one-year 
ahead inflation rate has consistently forecast 
above average inflation (even when actual 
inflation was close to or below the average) and 
has missed some of the turning points in 
inflation.28 Overall, one should stress that there 
may be other dimensions for assessing the 
individual performance of SPF forecasters that 
cannot be captured by the RMSE, such as the 
frequency with which forecasters reply, whether 
they provide information on either the 
assumptions or the probability distribution 
underlying their forecast, or whether they 
provide some qualitative insight into their 
forecasts (see Annex 2 for a more detailed 
discussion of alternative indicators for assessing 
the “quality” of SPF forecasters). 
Overall, given the short sample for analysing 
individual forecasters’ performance and 
characteristics, the results should be interpreted 
with caution. Even though a small number of 
forecasters show above-average performance 
across a number of the indicators presented, the 
sample period is too short to provide a robust test. 
Chart 6 Box-whisker plots for unemployment forecasts (rolling horizons)
One-year ahead Two-year ahead
Sources: ECB, Eurostat and ECB calculations.
























































28  In addition, some of the “better” inflation forecasters did not 
report inflation forecasts for the period when inflation was 
significantly higher than expected. The fact that forecasters do 
not generally reply to all rounds and for all forecast variables 
and horizons complicates such a comparative analysis.




Table 6 Heterogeneity of forecast performance (rolling horizons)
(root mean squared errors)
Inflation rate Real GDP growth Unemployment rate
1-year ahead 2-years ahead 1-year ahead 2-years ahead 1-year ahead 2-years ahead
Minimum 0.4 0.3 0.9 1.1 0.4 0.5
Average 0.6 0.5 1.0 1.3 0.8 0.9
Maximum 0.9 0.8 1.3 1.7 1.1 1.3
Source: ECB calculations.26
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FORECAST PERFORMANCE AND NATIONAL 
LOCATION OF PANEL MEMBERS
We now briefly consider whether the forecast 
performance of panel members differs according 
to their country of origin and, in particular, 
whether they are influenced by national 
economic developments when producing their 
euro area forecasts. For example, do panellists 
from countries with above-average inflation 
have systematically higher forecasts for 
inflation than panellists from countries with 
below-average inflation? Once again, the 
analysis should be interpreted with caution 
since, in some countries, only one or two 
respondents have responded a sufficient number 
of times to be scrutinised. Even in the case of 
Germany, which has the largest number of 
regular respondents, there are only between 
8 and 11 forecasters depending on the variable 
and horizon in question. 
Chart 7 indicates that for inflation and GDP 
growth there appears to be no relationship 
between the forecast error of respondents 
from a specific country and the average rate 
of growth of the forecast variable in the 
country.29, 30 With regard to the unemployment 
rate, a small positive correlation exists, 
suggesting that countries with a lower 
unemployment rate are more likely to over-
forecast the euro area unemployment rate; this 
is counter to the a priori expectation. A broadly 
similar picture holds true for the two-year ahead 
horizons. All in all, on the basis of this 
preliminary analysis, there appears to be no 
significant link between average national 
developments in the forecast variable and the 
forecast error for the euro area of respondents 
from each country. Chart 8 illustrates that there 
are no significant differences between average 
forecast errors (in terms of RMSE) of forecasters 
based inside the euro area and those based 
Chart 7 The relationship between average 














x-axis: average inflation 1999-2006* 
y-axis: mean error one-year ahead (in percentage point)
x-axis: average GDP growth 1999-2006* 


















x-axis: average unemployment rate 1999-2006* 
y-axis: mean error one-year ahead (in percentage point)









Correlation between SPF respondents’ forecast error 
and average national inﬂ  ation rate
Correlation between SPF respondents’ forecast error 
and average national real GDP growth
Correlation between SPF respondents’ forecast error 
and national unemployment level
Sources: Eurostat and ECB calculations.
29 Removing the outlier in terms of GDP growth (i.e. Ireland, 
where GDP growth averaged around 6% since 1999) yields a 
slightly significant negative relationship for the 4-quarter ahead 
horizon but not for the 8-quarter ahead horizon.
30   The same picture would hold true if one were to plot the 
relationship with the average forecast level of respondents from 
a specific country instead of the forecast error. 27
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outside the euro area (Denmark, Sweden and 
the United Kingdom). Although for four of the 
six permutations (three variables and two 
horizons), the average forecast error of 
forecasters inside the euro area is fractionally 
below that of the others – the exceptions being 
unemployment one year ahead and GDP two 
years ahead. This is, however, often only visible 
from the second decimal point.
FINANCIAL AND NON-FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
Another issue that we investigate is whether 
forecasts from financial institutions are different 
from those from non-financial institutions (e.g. 
research institutes and employer or employee 
bodies). On the one hand, the commercial 
nature of financial institutions could mean that 
their credibility in forecasting is very important 
and that significant resources are therefore 
devoted to forecasting.31 On the other hand, 
non-financial institutions may not face the same 
commercial pressures and disciplines that 
financial institutions face, but may also be more 
free to produce forecasts that deviate from the 
average. In any case, the evidence from Table 7 
does not suggest any difference between these 
two broad types of forecasting institution. 
Across all the forecast variables and horizons, 
there are only minor differences between the 
different forecast statistics. Thus, in terms of 
the RMSE statistic, non-financial institutions 
did marginally better at forecasting inflation 
one year ahead, but slightly worse for 
unemployment two years ahead; for the other 
variables and horizons, the RMSE statistics 
were exactly equal. Conversely, financial 
institutions did marginally better (in terms of 
both mean error and mean absolute error) when 
forecasting GDP growth two years ahead. To 
sum up, the evidence to date does not suggest 
any significant difference in the average 
forecast performance of financial and non-
financial institutions.
Chart 8 Average forecast errors (RMSE) for 




























0.5 1.0 1.3 0.8 0.9
0.6 1.0 1.3 0.8 1.0
RMSE
Source: ECB calculations.
31  See Batchelor (2001) for a comparison of G7 economic forecasts 
made by private sector economists with those of 
intergovernmental agencies.
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3  ASSESSING FORECAST UNCERTAINTY USING 
THE SPF
Although most economic forecasts are presented 
in terms of the point estimate of the variable 
being forecast, the point estimate itself conveys 
only a limited amount of information about 
the underlying forecast. As discussed in the 
introduction, the ECB SPF not only captures 
respondents’ subjective assessments of the 
expected value for each of the three 
macroeconomic variables over alternative 
horizons, but also obtains specific quantitative 
information regarding the uncertainty 
surrounding these expectations. More 
specifically, SPF participants are also asked to 
assign a probability distribution to their 
forecasts. This distribution provides information 
about the probability, expressed as a percentage, 
of the future outcome being within a specific 
range. The probability distribution resulting 
from the aggregation of responses also helps to 
assess how, on average, survey participants 
gauge the risk of the actual outcome being 
above or below the most likely range. Such 
quantitative information on the uncertainty 
surrounding the macroeconomic outlook is 
increasingly highlighted as an important part of 
the overall macroeconomic information set that 
should be used by economic policy-makers and 
central banks (see, for example, the discussions 
in Tay and Wallis (2000), Wallis (2001) or Sims 
(2002)).32, 33
Measures of uncertainty, in general, may be 
useful for a number of reasons. First, they can 
provide additional insight beyond that provided 
by considering point estimates alone. For 
example, if a shock occurs, it might take some 
time for forecasters to assess the likely impact 
of this shock and to incorporate it into their 
baseline forecasts. However, they might first 
signal the possible impact of this shock in their 
estimation of uncertainty. It could also be the 
case that some risks, which are difficult to 
quantify, could give rise to changes in the 
assessment of uncertainty without necessarily 
changing the point forecasts. Second, 
uncertainty could be of interest in terms of 
considering credibility issues. In particular, 
although point estimates could be anchored by 
explicit policy goals, it is possible that changes 
in uncertainty could highlight an increase or 
decrease in confidence in the likelihood of the 
underlying goals being achieved.34 Finally, 
uncertainty premia play an important role in 
many economic models of consumer and 
investor behaviour (see, for example, Lahiri 
et al. (1988), Giordani and Söderlind (2003) 
and D’Amico and Orphanides (2006)). Thus, 
movements in survey measures of uncertainty 
may help us to understand the evolution of 
financial market variables as well as households’ 
and firms’ decision-making. In addition, 
information on forecast uncertainty that is 
collected from private agents constitutes a 
useful assessment that may complement (though 
not replace) a central bank’s own assessment of 
forecast uncertainty.
There are a number of ways forecast uncertainty 
may be measured in the context of the SPF. The 
best measure depends on the specific issue. For 
instance, one could be interested in the general 
level of uncertainty surrounding the point 
estimate, the probability that the outcome is 
above or below a certain threshold, or to what 
extent forecasters disagree with each other 
about the most likely outcome. The SPF allows 
us to address most of these aspects, as it 
provides us with information both on 
respondents’ point estimates and on the 
probability distributions underlying their point 
estimates. Table 8 summarises each of the 
measures of forecast uncertainty considered in 
this section. We first consider “dispersion” 
32  The importance of probability event and density forecasts can 
be justified within a decision-based framework (see Pesaran and 
Skouras (2002)). In particular, for users of forecasts, only in the 
restricted case of decision-making under quadratic loss 
functions and linear constraints are point forecasts sufficient for 
decision-making. Under more general non-quadratic loss 
functions and/or non-linear constraints, probability forecasts or 
even the entire predictive joint probability distribution of all 
relevant state variables are needed. 
33  Zarnowitz and Lambros (1987) highlighted the relevance of the 
alternative measures of forecast uncertainty that can be 
constructed from survey data, while Giordani and Söderlind 
(2003) provide a more recent discussion.
34  This issue is addressed explicitly in Section 4.29
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(both in terms of point estimates and probability 
distributions) in the measures of uncertainty 
(numbers 1-4 in Table 8) before considering 
other characteristics of the forecast probability 
distribution that may also be informative.
3.1 ALTERNATIVE  DISPERSION-BASED 
UNCERTAINTY INDICATORS FROM THE SPF 
DISAGREEMENT AS A MEASURE OF UNCERTAINTY
One of the most frequently used approaches to 
measuring uncertainty in surveys has been to 
look at disagreement (or consensus) among 
survey respondents about their point forecasts 
(see Zarnowitz and Lambros (1987)).35 Using 
disagreement as a measure of uncertainty makes 
some sense, to the extent that different 
forecasters have a different assessment of the 
outlook, which, in turn, reflects the overall 
uncertainty surrounding the outlook. Hence, a 
high level of disagreement may be indicative of 
a high level of uncertainty. However, a number 
of caveats should be borne in mind. First and 
foremost, disagreement is not a pure measure of 
uncertainty but only a proxy. As a result, the 
level of disagreement may not correlate 
perfectly with actual forecast uncertainty. For 
example, even though the overall level of 
uncertainty may have increased, it is quite 
possible that forecasters may at the same time 
increasingly agree with each other about the 
most likely outcome. It could also be that 
forecasters do not change their view on the 
most likely outcome, but feel more or less 
uncertain about it. In such cases, indicators of 
disagreement cannot capture the change in 
uncertainty and so an alternative measure is 
required. Second, the scope for disagreement 
may be related to the number of respondents. 
Third, if there are differences in the quality of 
the forecasters or in the frequency or timing 
with which forecasters update their forecasts, 
an outlying forecast may not be indicative of 
disagreement or uncertainty, but may simply 
indicate that a specific forecaster has not taken 
relevant information on board.36
DISPERSION INDICATORS DERIVED FROM THE 
FORECAST DISTRIBUTION
If there is information on the probability 
distribution underlying the point forecasts, a 
more natural measure of uncertainty is the 
spread of the forecast distribution, as measured 
Table 8 Summary of forecast uncertainty measures
Type Use of point estimates or distribution Calculation
1 Disagreement Point estimates Standard deviation of point estimates1)
2 “Individual uncertainty” Distribution Average standard deviation (variance) of individual 
distributions
3 “Aggregate uncertainty” Distribution Standard deviation (variance) of aggregate 
distribution
4 “Combined forecast uncertainty” Distribution and point estimates “Combined forecast” standard deviation (variance)2)
5 “Proxy skew” Distribution and point estimates Mean of aggregate distribution minus average of 
point estimates
6 “Individual kurtosis” Distribution Average kurtosis of individual distributions
7 “Aggregate kurtosis” Distribution Kurtosis of aggregate distribution
1) Use either unadjusted or quasi-standard deviation.
2) Proxied by difference between individual uncertainty (i.e. average variance of the individual distributions) and disagreement 
(i.e. variance of point estimates).
35  Disagreement is usually measured by the standard deviation of 
the point forecasts, which captures the dispersion of point 
estimates across the panel of participants. Sometimes, in order 
to reduce the possible impact of outliers, the quasi-standard 
deviation is used (see Giordani and Söderlind (2003)). The 
quasi-standard deviation proxies the standard deviation by 
taking half the difference between the 84th and 16th percentiles 
(i.e. 68% of the distribution). 
36  Although the SPF is made up of professional forecasters, it is 
possible that forecasters do not update the forecasts at the same 
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by its standard deviation (or variance).37 The 
standard deviation of a distribution is essentially 
a summary statistic of the dispersion of possible 
events around the mean. Thus, the more it is 
considered that possible future events are 
dispersed from the mean, the higher the standard 
deviation and the associated future uncertainty. 
However, different interpretations may be 
drawn depending on whether one considers the 
average standard deviation of each individual 
probability distribution or the aggregate 
distribution.
The average standard deviation of the individual 
distributions captures uncertainty as reported 
by individual respondents, but does not in any 
way capture differences across individuals. 
Thus, it is possible that individuals report the 
same standard deviation from one round to the 
next, but disagree more among themselves 
about the actual point estimate. In this case, 
simply taking the average of the individual 
standard deviations does not capture the changes 
in the dispersion of the point estimates, even 
though such increased disagreement may partly 
reflect a change in overall uncertainty. 
A second approach is to take the standard 
deviation of the aggregate distribution.38 It is 
possible to show that the variance of the 
aggregate distribution is equal to the average 
variance of the individual distributions (i.e. 
individuals’ uncertainty) plus the variance of 
the point estimates (i.e. disagreement). Thus, 
this measure takes into account both individual 
uncertainty and disagreement.39
COMBINED FORECAST UNCERTAINTY
A third possible measure of forecast uncertainty 
that can be constructed using the SPF data is 
what Giordani and Söderlind (2003) call the 
“combined forecast” uncertainty. They argue 
that if the sample is large enough, cross-
sectional idiosyncratic movements in the 
forecast errors are averaged out and one is left 
with only common movements. They also show 
that, under certain circumstances, the combined 
forecast uncertainty may be written as the 
average variance of the individual distributions 
(i.e. individuals’ uncertainty) minus the variance 
of the point estimates (i.e. disagreement). Thus, 
when forecasters disagree, combined forecast 
uncertainty will be smaller than the uncertainty 
measured by the average spread of individual 
forecast distributions. Such a measure may be 
particularly useful in the context of the SPF in 
order to provide an aggregate uncertainty 
indicator which takes account of the possible 
reduction in uncertainty due to the pooling of 
individual information sets. However, one 
drawback of this measure is that it is possible 
for the proxy of combined forecast variance to 
be negative if the variance of the point estimates 
is larger than the average variance of the 
individual distribution. Whilst practically this 
is not an insurmountable problem, theoretically 
the variance cannot be negative. Box 3 provides 
an example which highlights the advantages 
and disadvantages of the combined forecast 
uncertainty measure and the measures based on 
the aggregate and individual distributions. 
37  There are two ways of presenting the dispersion of a distribution, 
either in terms of its standard deviation or its variance (the 
standard deviation is simply the square root of the variance). 
The variance is useful as the different measures of dispersion 
presented below are linked to each other in terms of variance. 
However, the standard deviation (which is simply the square 
root of the variance) is usually reported, as it is in the same 
“dimension” (e.g. percentage points, millions) as the underlying 
variable. Furthermore, the standard deviation is often used 
when calculating confidence intervals for distributions.
38  The aggregate distribution is constructed simply by summing 
up the individual probabilities reported in the SPF and dividing 
by the number of respondents. Note that this “aggregate” 
distribution which combines the individual density forecasts (or 
probability distributions) is a specific form of what is known as 
a finite mixture distribution (see Wallis (2004)). 
39    For a further discussion on the relationship between 
disagreement, individual uncertainty and aggregate uncertainty, 
see Giordani and Söderlind  (2003) and Linden (2003).31
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Box 3
POTENTIAL LIMITATIONS OF THE ALTERNATIVE FORECAST UNCERTAINTY MEASURES
The chart below shows a simple illustration, which may serve to highlight the intuition behind 
and possible drawbacks of the alternative uncertainty measures. In this illustration, we have 
just two individuals (A and B), who report distributions with differing means (-3.5 and 3.5 in 
Example I and -0.5 and 0.5 in Example II) but the same standard deviations (unity). If one was 
to consider the simple average of the mean and standard deviation of the two distributions, the 
result would be a mean of zero and a standard deviation of unity in both examples. The aggregate 
distribution, however, whilst also having a mean of zero, would have a standard deviation 
larger than unity in both examples. This is because the disagreement between the two individuals 
is also taken into account. In this example, the combined forecast would also have a mean of 
zero, but in Example I the distribution is not defined, as the disagreement between the two 
individuals is larger than their individual assessment of uncertainty. Whilst the example 
presented may be an extreme case, it does occur in practice that the variance of the point 
estimates (or disagreement) is larger than the average individual assessment of uncertainty (the 
average variance of the distributions) and hence the combined forecast distribution is not 
defined. This is particularly the case for long-term unemployment expectations. In practice, 
this may indicate some problems with the assumptions required to reach the simplified measure 
of combined forecast uncertainty mentioned above. In Example II, the combined forecast 
uncertainty is defined and is lower than that of either the average or aggregate distributions.
Alternative measures of forecast uncertainty
(percentages)
To sum up, different indicators of uncertainty 
can therefore be constructed by considering the 
information contained in the individual 
distributions from the SPF in different ways. 
Each measure has some justification and may 
provide a different insight into the overall level 
of uncertainty surrounding the SPF expectations. 
It is therefore useful to compare and contrast 





Note: sd denotes standard deviation. Average refers to the average of the individual distributions, aggregate to the aggregate distribution 
and combined to the combined forecast”.
A: mean = -3.5, sd = 1.0
B: mean = 3.5, sd = 1.0
aggregate: mean = 0.0, sd > 1.0
average: mean = 0.0, sd = 1.0
























































A: mean = -0.5, sd = 1.0
B: mean = 0.5, sd = 1.0
aggregate: mean = 0.0, sd > 1.0
average: mean = 0.0, sd = 1.0
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3.2   COMPARISON OF ALTERNATIVE 
UNCERTAINTY INDICATORS FROM THE SPF
It should be noted that calculating the standard 
deviation of the SPF distributions is somewhat 
problematic in practice. The reason for this is 
that respondents are asked to attach probabilities 
to specific ranges. Thus, we only have 
information on the probability attached to the 
outcome being in a specific range, and not on 
how the probability is distributed within that 
range. If one assumes that all the probability is 
located in the centre of the range, this may bias 
upward the estimated standard deviation, as it 
is more likely that more of the probability 
within a range is located closer to the centre of 
the distribution than further away.40
One solution to the problem is to fit a Normal 
distribution to the individual distributions 
provided by SPF respondents (see, for example, 
D’Amico and Orphanides (2006));41 this will 
yield an estimated mean and a less biased 
estimate of the standard deviation. However, in 
some cases, the assumption of normality 
appears too extreme and also gives rise to other 
problems (such as eliminating skew and 
kurtosis). Hence, in what follows, we use an 
approach which assumes that all the probability 
for a given range relates to the mid-point of that 
range.42
Chart 9 plots the different indicators of 
uncertainty mentioned above for the case of 
one-year ahead inflation forecasts. The chart 
highlights the possible differing messages 
depending on which aspect of uncertainty is 
being focused on. Disagreement about point 
forecasts one year ahead, as measured by the 
standard deviation of the point estimates, 
fluctuated around 0.3 percentage point for 
most of the SPF rounds until 2003. Since then, 
however, there has been a decline in the level of 
disagreement to approximately 0.2 percentage 
point. Considering that the standard deviation of 
actual annual inflation rates and average forecast 
errors since 1999 have been around 0.5 percentage 
point, this level of disagreement is quite low, 
which, together with a gradually declining profile 
over the latter part of the sample period, suggests 
that it may not be a good proxy for overall 
inflation uncertainty; although the standard 
deviation of a series in itself does not indicate the 
uncertainty surrounding forecasts of that series. 
As regards the standard deviation of the aggregate 
distribution, this has tended to be at or slightly 
above 0.5 percentage point, although it was 
slightly lower between 1999 and 2001 and has 
been since 2004. The fact that the standard 
deviation of the aggregate distribution 
corresponds broadly to the level of historical 
40   One approach to correcting for this likely bias is to apply 
“Sheppard’s correction” (Stuart and Ord (1994)), which adjusts 
the calculated variance by subtracting one-twelfth of the squared 
bin width. However, this correction is not without its limitations 
either, particularly in the context of the SPF; see, for example, 
Lahiri and Liu (2006).
41  When normal is written with a capital letter (i.e. Normal), it is 
to denote that it is being used in the statistical sense of the word 
(e.g. that the distribution is Normally distributed).
42  As a cross-check, when Normal distributions were fitted to the 
aggregate and individual SPF distributions, the results and 
conclusions reported here still held; in some cases more 
strongly. For example, as the standard deviations of the Normal 
distributions are generally smaller than when it is assumed that 
all the probability relates to the mid-point of each range, this 
implies that the finding that SPF respondents generally 
underestimated uncertainty is robust.




Note: Disagreement is calculated as the standard deviation of 
the point estimates. Individual uncertainty is calculated as the 
average standard deviation of the individual probability 
distributions. Aggregate uncertainty is calculated as the 
standard deviation of the aggregate probability distribution and 
is positively related to both individual uncertainty and to 
disagreement. The combined forecast uncertainty is positively 
related to individual uncertainty and negatively related to 
disagreement.
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inflation volatility suggests that it may be a more 
reliable measure of the uncertainty surrounding 
the inflation outlook. The level of average 
individual uncertainty has been significantly 
lower, also compared with the historical standard 
deviation of actual inflation, suggesting that 
individual panel members may not fully capture 
the overall level of inflation uncertainty.43 It is, 
however, interesting to note that the profile of 
this indicator is somewhat different as it has 
tended to edge upwards over the period in question, 
suggesting that respondents have gradually 
adapted their perceptions to be more in line with 
the actual outcome. The level of uncertainty, as 
measured by the combined forecast, has also 
tended to edge upwards, driven by a combination 
of the lower level of disagreement and higher 
average individual uncertainty. Notwithstanding 
this gradual upward movement, the combined 
forecast uncertainty remains below the level that 
would be implied by the historical standard 
deviation of inflation over the period.  
The level of disagreement among SPF 
forecasters concerning the short-term outlook 
for GDP has been higher on average and 
more volatile than that for inflation. In particular, 
whilst it averaged about 0.3 percentage point 
between 1999 and 2001, after the terrorist 
attacks in the United States on 11 September 
2001, it rose sharply, reaching over 
0.5 percentage point at the end of 2001 (see 
Chart 10). Given that the actual standard 
deviations of the annual GDP growth rate and 
average forecast error have been greater than 
one percentage point since 1999, this level of 
disagreement is quite low. The profile of the 
standard deviation of the aggregate distribution 
has followed a similar pattern, but also at a 
relatively low level compared with the actual 
volatility of GDP growth. The profile of the 
combined forecast is not defined around end-
2001 and the beginning of 2002 as disagreement 
between forecasters was larger than the average 
individual assessment of uncertainty. At around 
0.45 percentage point, average individual 
uncertainty has been the most stable, although 
it did edge up between mid-2001 and late-2003, 
before easing back somewhat more recently. 
The profile of the level of disagreement about 
the short-term unemployment rate forecast was 
broadly similar to that of the short-term inflation 
forecast, i.e. fluctuating around 0.3 percentage 
point for most of the period since 1999, but has 
declined since 2004 (see Chart 11). The standard 
deviation of the unemployment rate has been 
0.5 percentage point over the same period. As 
regards the profile of the standard deviation of 
the aggregate distribution, there has been 
no clear pattern over time, with the exception 
that it has also tended to fluctuate around 
0.5 percentage point on average. 
To sum up, the evolution of the different measures 
of uncertainty has differed both according to the 
measure used and to the variable being considered. 
Based on the above analysis, our preferred 
measure of uncertainty is the standard deviation 
of the aggregate probability distribution, as it 
combines information both on the amount of 
Chart 10 Short-term real GDP growth 
forecast uncertainty
(percentage point)
Source: ECB calculations. 
Note: Disagreement is calculated as the standard deviation of 
the point estimates. Individual uncertainty is calculated as the 
average standard deviation of the individual probability 
distributions. Aggregate uncertainty is calculated as the 
standard deviation of the aggregate probability distribution and 
is positively related to both individual uncertainty and to 
disagreement. The combined forecast uncertainty is positively 
related to individual uncertainty and negatively related to 
disagreement.
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43  This is particularly the case when one allows for the upward bias 
in the calculated measure of the standard deviation of the 
distribution from assuming the weight is located in the centre of 
the ranges.34
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disagreement between forecasters and on their 
individual assessment of uncertainty. In the case 
of inflation, it is also the measure most consistent 
with the actual historical volatility of the forecast 
series (inflation) over the period. At the same 
time, caution is warranted when using the above 
indicators to assess macroeconomic risks. In 
particular, at the individual level, SPF respondents 
do not seem to fully capture the overall level of 
macroeconomic uncertainty. Moreover, even at 
the aggregate level, a more sophisticated 
evaluation of the SPF density forecasts (see 
Annex 3) suggests some evidence that respondents 
failed to accurately assess the risk of higher 
inflation outcomes over this period. In addition, 
SPF respondents may have also failed to 
accurately assess the risks of lower growth and 
higher unemployment associated with the 
economic downturn. 
3.3  OTHER CHARACTERISTICS OF THE FORECAST 
PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTION
If the probability distribution is Normally 
distributed, the mean and the standard deviation 
are sufficient to capture all the information 
contained in that distribution. However, as we 
shall see below, the SPF probability distributions 
(both at the individual level and aggregate level) 
frequently deviate from normality.44 As a result, it 
is important to consider other summary statistics 
in order to fully describe the information on 
macroeconomic uncertainty contained in the SPF 
probability distributions. In particular, higher 
“moment statistics”, such as the skew and kurtosis, 
may also be relevant. 
The skew is a measure of asymmetry in the 
distribution, i.e. whether the distribution looks 
the same to the right and the left of the mean.45 
Knowledge about the skew of a distribution 
may be particularly relevant where asymmetric 
risks are considered particularly important. For 
example, if an outcome of higher inflation is 
considered more damaging than an outcome of 
lower inflation, financial market participants 
attempt to hedge against inflation risk. 
An alternative measure of skew, which might 
be more robust to the calculation problem (see 
footnote 45), is to consider the relationship 
between the mean of the distribution and the 
point forecast as reported by respondents. To 
the extent that the point forecast can be 
interpreted as a modal or most likely value, the 
difference between the mean and the mode can 
44   Lahiri et al. (1988) show that the probability distributions 
underlying forecasts may not be Normal for the United States.
45   In practice, calculating the skew of the SPF distributions is 
somewhat problematic. The main reason for this is that respondents 
are asked to attach probabilities to specific ranges. Thus, we only 
have information on the probability attached to the outcome being 
in a specific range, and not on how the probability is distributed 
within that range. If it is assumed that all the probability is located 
at the centre of the range, this distorts the estimated skew, as it is 
more likely that more of the probability associated within a range 
is located closer to the centre of the distribution than further away. 
The possible solution cited above for estimating the standard 
deviation (i.e. by fitting a Normal distribution to the individual 
distributions provided by SPF respondents and maximising the fit 
over different estimates of the mean and standard deviation) is not 
suitable in this case, as fitting a Normal distribution suffers from 
the drawback that it, by definition, removes any skew and excess 
kurtosis at the level of the individual distributions. Thus, higher 
moment information is lost. It is also possible to fit alternative 
classes of distributions to the observed distribution. However, this 
adds another element of uncertainty to the interpretation of the 
distribution.




Note: Disagreement is calculated as the standard deviation of 
the point estimates. Individual uncertainty is calculated as the 
average standard deviation of the individual probability 
distributions. Aggregate uncertainty is calculated as the 
standard deviation of the aggregate probability distribution and 
is positively related to both individual uncertainty and to 
disagreement. The combined forecast uncertainty is positively 
related to individual uncertainty and negatively related to 
disagreement.
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be used as an indicator of skew.46 In particular, 
if the distribution is symmetric, the mean and 
modal forecast should be equal. However, if the 
distribution is skewed in either direction the two 
will differ. Thus, if there is upward skew (i.e. 
the risks are skewed to the upside), the mean 
will be larger than the mode and vice versa. 
Another specific way of considering uncertainty 
is to examine the probability associated with an 
outcome being above or below a specific 
threshold or value. This approach could be 
relevant when there is a policy target or 
officially declared range for the long-term 
value of a variable. For example, the ECB 
Governing Council announced that, over the 
medium term, inflation should be below, but 
close to, 2%. It is possible that market 
participants believe that this is the most likely 
outcome but may change their view on the risks 
associated with a higher outcome. Thus, the 
probability associated with an outcome above 
2% might be a useful indicator of the upside 
risk that forecasters associate with the ECB 
failing to meet its policy aim. Such a risk 
indicator is discussed in more detail in Section 
4 on long-term expectations.
The kurtosis of a distribution is often described 
as the “peakiness” of the distribution. It is a 
measure of whether the data are peaked or flat 
relative to a Normal distribution (i.e. excess 
kurtosis). Although the kurtosis of a distribution 
may also contain useful information about 
uncertainty, in particular, the likelihood of 
extreme events relative to a Normal distribution, 
in practice calculating the kurtosis of the SPF 
distributions is affected by similar problems 
to those outlined for calculating the skew.47 
Nonetheless, since the weights in the tails of 
the aggregate distribution will be larger, the 
more disagreement there is among forecasters, 
one might expect, a priori, the degree of kurtosis 
of the aggregate distribution to be larger than 
that of the individual distributions.
Considering the skew measures in practice, it 
appears that the balance of risks varies 
considerably across variables and over time in 
the SPF. As regards the balance of risks to the 
short-term inflation outlook, it appears that, 
with the exception of the earlier and latest 
rounds, SPF forecasters believe that they have 
been on the upside (see Chart 12). Interestingly, 
whilst respondents correctly perceived the 
balance of risks to be on the upside, they may 
have underestimated the magnitude of these 
risks. Indeed, since 2000, the mean of the 
aggregate distribution has been approximately 
0.03 percentage point above the average of the 
point estimates.48 However, the actual outcome 
has been even higher, with the mean error being 
0.5 percentage point. Similarly, although actual 
HICP annual inflation since 2000 has averaged 
above 2%, until the round for the second quarter 
of 2006, the aggregate probability associated 
with an outcome above 2% was never more 
than 50%, even though it did increase 
substantially over the course of 1999 and 
2000. 
Chart 12 Indicators of skew surrounding 
short-term one-year ahead forecasts
(proxied by the mean of the aggregate distributions minus the 


















skew for real GDP growth
skew for unemployment
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Source: ECB calculations.
46  It is not always clear whether respondents are providing a mean 
(most likely on average), mode (most likely outcome) or median 
(outcome that has 50% of the distribution above and below) 
forecast.
47  Possible proxy measures include considering the kurtosis of the 
distribution of point estimates or considering the weight of the 
distribution in the tail ranges.
48  We calculate the mean of the distribution by taking the mid-
point of each range (e.g. for the range 1.5-1.9% the mid-point 
is 1.7%) and multiplying it by the probability reported by 
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In contrast to the short-term inflation forecasts, 
the skew associated with the short-term GDP 
forecasts has generally been to the downside. 
As regards the skew of the unemployment 
distribution, the mean at the beginning of the 
sample period was generally above the average 
of the point estimates. This would suggest that 
the SPF forecasters perceived upward risks, 
although since 2002 the balance of risks has 
been broadly balanced, with the exception of 
the latest round in the fourth quarter of 2006. 
As this lower degree of upward skew has 
occurred after a period of gradual upward 
revisions in unemployment rate expectations, 
it suggests that some of the higher upside 
risks in the early part of the sample were 
gradually incorporated into respondents 
baseline expectations. 
Chart 13 plots the excess kurtosis measures for 
the one-year ahead inflation forecast. Two 
measures are presented, one based on the 
average excess kurtosis (compared with a 
Normal distribution) of the individual 
distributions and one based on the aggregate 
distribution. A general result for each variable 
and time horizon is that the average of the 
former is usually smaller than the latter. For 
example, Chart 13 shows the individual and 
aggregate measures of kurtosis for the short-
term inflation forecasts. This result is not 
surprising, as the aggregate distribution is 
affected by the differing means (i.e. 
disagreement) of the individual distributions, 
tending to add more probability mass to the 
tails of the aggregate distribution. Thus, on 
average, and relative to a Normal distribution, 
the individual distributions attach less weight 
to extreme outcomes. Over the first half of the 
sample period, the average individual 
distribution attached a similar weight to extreme 
events as would be predicted by a Normal 
distribution, i.e. the excess kurtosis hovered 
around zero. By contrast, the aggregate 
distribution attaches more weight to extreme 
events relative to a Normal distribution. 
3.4 OVERALL  ASSESSMENT  OF  UNCERTAINTY 
MEASURES
Table 9 presents a summary of the average 
values of some of the alternative measures of 
uncertainty for the short-term horizons that can 
be calculated from the SPF data. Although these 
measures are not exhaustive, they should cover 
many of the different aspects of uncertainty that 
one might wish to address. The first measure 
(disagreement) does not capture uncertainty in 
terms of probability, but may nonetheless be an 
informative proxy and is easily understood. The 
different measures of the standard deviation/
variance of the distribution are closer to the 
classical concept of uncertainty, although the 
different measures can give rise to different 
assessments of the level of uncertainty. The 
skew and kurtosis measures give some insight 
into uncertainty, either in a directional sense 
(i.e. a preponderance of upside or downside 
risks) or relative to the mean (i.e. are extreme 
events relatively likely or not). 
Although it is clear that uncertainty is a multi-
faceted concept that does not lend itself to easy 
summary by one statistic, there is a danger of 
confusion with such a range of statistics. 
Therefore, although we compute and report 
each of the different measures, we would 
suggest that the standard deviation of the 
aggregate distribution should be taken as a 
benchmark measure from the SPF. In this 
regard, the fact that the aggregate uncertainty 
Chart 13 Kurtosis of short-term 
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Source: ECB calculations.37
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measures are lower than the forecast RMSE 
statistics for each variable supports the 
assessment of the analysis in Annex 3 that 
respondents failed to accurately assess the risks 
over the period under consideration.
In this regard, it is interesting to consider 
whether this measure of uncertainty tallies with 
our qualitative assessment of macroeconomic 
uncertainty. Since 1999, it is thought that geo-
political events have impacted significantly on 
the overall uncertainty surrounding economic 
forecasts. In particular, the terrorist attacks in 
the United States on 11 September 2001 and 
subsequent developments are thought to have 
considerably heightened the uncertainty and 
volatility in key macroeconomic variables, such 
as oil prices and stock markets. It may therefore 
be interesting to construct an aggregate indicator 
of macroeconomic uncertainty based on the 
three variables included in the SPF. For 
example, Chart 14 shows a simple arithmetic 
average of the standard deviations of aggregate 
distributions for the short-term forecast for 
each of the key variables in the SPF (inflation, 
growth and unemployment). Although this is a 
crude summary statistic, it appears to show that 
“average” uncertainty was indeed higher 
between the second half of 2001 and 2003. 
Since 2004, however, “average” uncertainty 
appears to have returned to more normal levels. 
The indicator also correlates quite well with an 
indicator of stock market volatility implied 
from option prices. In this regard, a promising 
area for future research will be to understand 
more fully the factors driving the uncertainty 
inherent in economic forecasts and 
expectations.
4 SPF  LONG-TERM  EXPECTATIONS 
SPF panellists are also invited to provide an 
assessment of their longer-term outlook for the 
euro area economy (i.e. five-year ahead 
forecasts for inflation, real GDP growth and 
unemployment in the euro area). By nature, 
these longer-term forecasts are expected to be 
free of the influence of cyclical developments 
and various shocks that are generally not 
foreseeable at this horizon. Longer-term 
forecasts might thus be expected to be less 
volatile than the shorter-term forecasts and to 
provide a picture that yields some insight to 
participants’ views of the main trends that are 
thought to shape the euro area economy in the 
longer term. For example, longer-term inflation 
Chart 14 Average of uncertainty surrounding short-
term forecasts of inflation, growth and unemployment, 














implied volatility of the euro area stock
market (% per annum; right-hand scale)
average overall uncertainty (left-hand scale)
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Sources: Bloomberg and ECB calculations.
Table 9 Summary of the average values of uncertainty measures for short-term horizons since 
SPF round for the first quarter of 1999
Type Inflation 1) GDP growth 1) Unemployment 1)
1 “Disagreement” 0.27 0.33 0.26
2 “Individual uncertainty” 0.40 0.47 0.37
3 “Aggregate uncertainty” 0.50 0.57 0.50
4 “Combined forecast uncertainty” 0.34 0.34 0.30
5 “Proxy skew” 0.03 -0.06 0.02
6 “Individual kurtosis” -0.17 -0.32 -0.12
7 “Aggregate kurtosis” 0.91 1.25 1.89
Source: ECB calculations.
1) Average value since the first quarter of 1999 SPF round for rolling one-year ahead horizon.
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forecasts may help to assess the ECB’s 
credibility in maintaining the objective of price 
stability; longer-term real GDP growth forecasts 
may provide an insight into the expected trend 
potential growth for the economy and the 
longer-term unemployment expectations may 
provide an assessment of market participants’ 
perception of the possible effects of structural 
reforms and changes in the labour market.
There are fewer forecasts available for longer-
term horizons than for shorter-term horizons. 
The question about longer-term expectations 
was only asked once in 1999 and once in 2000 
(in the January surveys). From the beginning of 
2001, it was then included in every survey 
round. The maximum number of replies is 
therefore limited to 26 survey rounds compared 
with 32 for the shorter horizons. Furthermore, 
longer-term expectations are generally provided 
by a smaller number of participants. As we have 
seen, the SPF collects the views of 59 forecasters 
on average in each round. Of these, an average 
of 45 provided long-term point expectations 
and 39 added probability distributions to these 
long-term forecasts. Inflation and GDP growth 
have slightly higher response rates than 
unemployment for which only 41 panellists on 
average provide a long-term forecast. Assessing 
and interpreting SPF replies about longer-term 
expectations might thus warrant greater caution 
given the smaller number of observations. 
Nevertheless, around three-quarters of those 
responding to the survey do provide long-term 
expectations and this share has been quite stable 
since the beginning of the survey, providing 
useful information on expectations for the long-
term outlook for the euro area economy.49
4.1 LONG-TERM  INFLATION  EXPECTATIONS:  AN 
INDICATOR OF THE ECB’S CREDIBILITY
The ECB’s monetary strategy aims to ensure 
long-term price stability, defined, in quantitative 
terms, as a “year-on-year increase in the HICP 
for the euro area of below, but close to, 2%”. 
Well-anchored long-term inflation expectations 
are thus a desirable feature in the monetary 
policy framework, since they reflect the extent 
to which economic agents believe the ECB will 
achieve this inflation objective. Long-term 
inflation expectations may be derived from 
financial markets either from the term structure 
of interest rates or from the difference in yields 
between conventional Treasury bonds and 
bonds specifically linked to the inflation rate.50 
None of these measures is ideal since they may 
be affected by technical market factors and 
various premia, in particular an inflation risk 
premium. Direct long-term expectations 
obtained from surveys, such as the SPF, may 
therefore provide a valuable complementary 
piece of information. 
A central bank’s ability to anchor inflation 
expectations can be assessed by the extent to 
which long-term inflation expectations respond 
to changes in very short-term inflation 
expectations (see, for example, Castelnuovo et 
al. (2003), Bordes and Clerc (2004)). In other 
words, if a shock, such as a surge in oil prices, 
pushes up the short-term inflation outlook but 
has no visible effect on long-term inflation 
expectations, it means that economic agents 
believe that the central bank will ensure that 
such developments will not spill over into more 
medium-term price pressures. Using SPF 
replies, one way to assess the credibility of 
monetary policy is to check whether there is no 
(or only very little) correlation between changes 
in short-term and longer-term inflation 
expectations. Chart 15 plots the individual 
revisions in short term (i.e. one-year ahead) and 
in the long term (i.e. five-year ahead) inflation 
expectations for the period from the first quarter 
of 1999 to the fourth quarter of 2006. It suggests 
that there is indeed no more than a weak 
relationship between movements in short-term 
and long-term inflation forecasts. The 
correlation between the two is statistically 
insignificant at 0.08, suggesting that the ECB 
has been fairly successful in anchoring long-
49  The number of respondents to the questions on longer-term 
expectations also compares favourably with Consensus 
Economics and the Euro Zone Barometer, both of which have 
approximately ten respondents replying to their questions on 
longer-term expectations.
50  For more details on the derivation of the “break-even inflation 
rate” derived from financial markets, see ECB (2002).39
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term expectations, particularly compared with 
other central banks (see Bordes and Clerc, 
2004).
Castelnuovo et al. (2003) add another condition 
for long-term expectations to be considered 
well anchored. Long-term forecasts must 
exhibit a low level of volatility around a level 
compatible with the target range defined by the 
quantitative announcement of the inflation 
objective. Chart 16 reports the developments of 
long-term inflation forecasts made by SPF 
participants since the beginning of the survey. 
It shows that average long-term expected 
inflation has remained quite stable since the 
beginning of the survey. On average, it stood at 
1.88% with a standard deviation of ±0.04 
percentage point. The average long-term 
inflation expectation was 1.9% at the start of 
Stage III of EMU in 1999. It declined to 1.8% 
in 2000 and then shifted upwards to stand at 
1.9% again at the end of 2002. Since then, it has 
remained broadly stable at below, but close to, 
2%, confirming the stability of SPF long-term 
inflation expectations.
Chart 16 also plots the lower and upper quartiles, 
which correspond to the 25th and the 75th 
percentile responses. The upper quartile has 
remained unchanged at 2.0% since the beginning 
of the survey. In other words, at least 25% of 
forecasters have always expected long-term 
inflation to be equal to or above 2%. The lower 
quartile, on the other hand, increased steadily 
until the first quarter of 2003 and remained flat 
at 1.8% until the third quarter of 2006 when it 
increased further to 1.9%, indicating that at 
least 50% of SPF forecasters believed long-
term inflation would stand between 1.9% and 
2.0%. This range has narrowed since the 
beginning of the survey and has remained 
relatively stable since the review and 
clarification of the ECB’s monetary policy 
strategy (in the second quarter of 2003), when 
the ECB announced that price stability was 
defined as inflation not only being “below”, but 
also “close to”, 2%.
Shifts in the median, also reported in Chart 16, 
reveal that this growing consensus does not 
imply that SPF forecasters take the long-term 
ECB inflation objective for granted without 
questioning it. A significant number of 
individual responses are indeed revised from 
one survey round to the next. When the SPF 
survey first started, a particularly large number 
of respondents (around two-thirds in the first 
quarters of 2000 and 2001) changed their 
forecast for long-term inflation. This may 
reflect a greater understanding of the ECB’s 
Chart 15 Relationship between revisions to 
short-term and long-term inflation forecasts
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Chart 16 SPF long-term inflation forecasts
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medium-term monetary policy objective. Since 
2001 this number has fallen, but remains 
significant at around 30% for each survey round 
since 2002 (see Chart 17). Overall, since the 
beginning of the survey, nearly all SPF 
participants who have provided long-term 
inflation expectations have adjusted their 
expectations at least once. Among those, about 
two-thirds have tended to increase their 
expectations (by an average 0.3 percentage point) 
and the remaining third has tended to reduce 
their expectations by about the same amount.51 
Consequently, the distribution of long-term 
inflation estimates shifted from survey to 
survey, reflecting the changes of SPF 
respondents’ forecasts (see Chart 18). In 
particular, the number of SPF respondents 
providing long-term inflation forecasts below 
1.8% decreased substantially between 2001 and 
mid-2005: in 2001 more than 30% of respondents 
provided a long-term inflation forecast below 
1.8%, whereas in 2006 only 8% did so. This 
illustrates both the changes in opinion regarding 
the long-term inflation outlook and the gradual 
narrowing in the range of replies provided by 
SPF respondents. It is also interesting to see 
that SPF long-term inflation forecasts have 
mainly tended to be either 1.8% or 2.0% and 
that, until 2005, relatively few respondents 
projected long-term inflation at 1.9%. While it 
is impossible to know the reasons behind these 
revisions of longer-term inflation expectations, 
the gradual decline in SPF respondents’ 
disagreement might reflect the impact of the 
ECB’s clarification that price stability is 
considered consistent with HICP inflation at 
below, but close to, 2% over the medium term. 
The average probability distribution has not 
changed dramatically since the beginning of the 
SPF survey. In particular, there has been a 
consistently low perceived risk of deflation. In 
addition, there has always been less than a 10% 
probability assigned to the risk of inflation 
being below 1%. In general, SPF respondents 
believe that the probability that long-term 
inflation will eventually stand between 1.5% 
and 1.9% is the highest (38% on average), in 
line with their average point estimate. Although 
this probability tended to decrease slowly 
between 2001 and 2004, it has rebounded 
somewhat since the beginning of 2005. 
A measure of the skew of the probability 
distribution, derived as the difference between 
the implied mean of the aggregate distribution 
Chart 17 Percentage of SPF participants 
revising their long-term inflation 
expectations from one round to the next
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Chart 18 Distribution of long-term inflation 
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51    These estimates correspond to the difference between the 
average long-term expectation in the first year of participation 
(generally 1999) and that of the last year of participation 
(generally 2006). It does not take into account possible upward 
or downward revisions in between. Annual individual averages 
are rounded to the first decimal point.41
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and the average long-term inflation forecast, 
provides a clearer picture of the balance of risks 
attached to long-term inflation. Chart 19 shows 
that the overall balance of risks attached to 
long-term inflation has been slightly on the 
downside on average. Note, however, that we 
calculate the mean of the distribution by taking 
the mid-point of each range (e.g. for the 1.5%-
1.9% range the mid-point is 1.7%) and 
multiplying it by the probability of the outcome 
being in that range, as reported by the 
respondents. It could also be argued that the 
mid-point in the example above is 1.75% (i.e. 
that the range goes from 1.50%-1.99%). Hence, 
for this reason, and the fact that all the 
probability associated with a specific range is 
allocated to the mid-point of the range and not 
distributed over the range, the resulting measure 
of skew should be interpreted with caution, 
particularly when it lies in the range 0.00 
percentage point to 0.05 percentage point. 
Considering the ECB’s definition of price 
stability, the probability that long-term inflation 
may eventually be equal to or above 2% may 
be seen as a useful additional indicator of the 
risk that forecasters associate with the ECB 
failing to meet its objective. According to SPF 
respondents, there has always been some 
probability associated with a five-year ahead 
inflation outcome being above 2%. Between 
2001 and 2003, this probability increased 
gradually from around 35% to more than 40% 
(see Chart 20). Since then, it fluctuated between 
40% and 50%. The interpretation of this 
indicator, however, is not unambiguous. It 
captures changes in the probability mass in the 
upper tail of the inflation distribution, but 
provides no information either about the shape 
of the distribution or about changes in the mean 
(or mode) associated to it. It may nevertheless 
be related to the inflation risk that market 
participants might want to hedge when investing 
in inflation-linked bonds. Indeed, there appears 
to be some co-movement between the break-
even inflation rates extracted from the yield 
differences between conventional government 
bonds and inflation-linked bonds and the 
probability from the SPF that long-term inflation 
may be equal to or above 2%. The correlation 
coefficient between the two series was 0.68 
percentage point over the period 2002-2006. 
This may be because break-even inflation rates 
should incorporate not only the mean of market 
participants’ inflation expectations, but also an 
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Note: there were no questions related to longer-term inflation 
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Chart 20 Probability that five-year ahead 
HICP inflation may be equal to or above 2% 
and the ten-year break-even inflation rate
Sources: Reuters and ECB calculations. 
Note: Break-even inflation rates correspond to monthly 
averages; SPF five-year ahead inflation forecast corresponds to 
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inflation risk premium (which, if positive, tends 
to push up break-even inflation rates) and a 
liquidity premium (which compensates 
investors for the lower liquidity of inflation-
linked vis-à-vis conventional government bonds 
and tends to reduce break-even inflation rates).52 
Quantifying these premia is far from 
straightforward. It is likely that the liquidity 
premium charged on inflation-linked bonds has 
declined over time, with the growth of the euro 
area market for inflation-linked government 
debt over recent years. Consequently, it is very 
likely that the inflation risk premium dominates 
at present. This, in turn, might explain why the 
break-even inflation rate has mostly stayed 
somewhat above 2% since late 2003, whilst 
average SPF forecasts have remained broadly 
unchanged at 1.9%. Hence, given that the SPF 
probability that long-term inflation will be 
equal to or above 2% could be a proxy for the 
risk market participants wish to hedge, the link 
with the break-even inflation rate may not be 
surprising, given that the latter contains some 
elements of risk premium.
Finally, one may assess the overall uncertainty 
assigned to long-term inflation expectations 
using the uncertainty measures discussed in 
Section 3, and in particular, the decomposition 
between individual uncertainty and disagreement 
amongst forecasters (see Chart 21). The overall 
uncertainty surrounding longer-term inflation 
expectations has remained broadly stable over 
time, fluctuating around 0.6 percentage point. 
Interestingly, the chart also confirms the 
significant decline in disagreement about long-
term inflation forecasts among SPF respondents 
which reflects the growing consensus that 
inflation will be below, but close to, 2%. This 
pattern may be linked to the clarification of the 
quantitative definition of price stability which 
occurred around the time of the review of the 
ECB’s monetary policy strategy in 2003. By 
contrast, individual uncertainty appears to 
have increased, albeit mildly, over time. The 
combination of less disagreement and greater 
individual uncertainty means that the combined 
forecast uncertainty also increased over time.
4.2  LONG-TERM REAL GDP GROWTH 
EXPECTATIONS: A VIEW ON TREND 
POTENTIAL OUTPUT GROWTH
Long-term real GDP growth expectations can 
provide indications about how trend potential 
output growth is perceived, including its 
evolution over time and the uncertainty 
surrounding it. Chart 22 shows that, having 
peaked at around 2.7% in early 2001 at the 
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Chart 22 SPF longer-term GDP growth 
expectations
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52  For a more detailed discussion of the premia embodied in break-
even inflation rates, see Kwan (2005) and ECB (2004b).43
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height of the new economy debate, long-term 
growth expectations have declined steadily, 
reaching 2.0% in the SPF round for the fourth 
quarter of 2006. Whilst part of this decline may 
reflect a toning down of earlier exuberant 
expectations, some of it is undoubtedly due to 
the poor growth performance of the euro area 
economy observed since 2001. It is also 
interesting to note that this increased pessimism 
is relatively common across SPF panel members, 
as indicated by the downward parallel movement 
of both the 25th and 75th percentiles. 
Although average long-term growth expectations 
have been progressively revised downwards 
since early 2001, the frequency distribution of 
point forecasts reveals that most respondents 
continue to report long-term growth expectations 
in the 2.0%-2.5% range (see Chart 23). This is 
consistent with the ECB’s estimated euro area 
trend potential growth (see ECB, 2005a). 
However, this average estimate does conceal 
the fact that many of the respondents who 
originally reported long-term growth 
expectations at the higher end of this range are 
now making forecasts at the lower end of this 
range. Furthermore, in the most recent rounds, 
only a few respondents reported long-term 
growth expectations above 2.5%, whilst the 
percentage reporting below 2.0% rose to above 
10% for the first time in the SPF round for the 
fourth quarter of 2004 and to 48% in the round 
for the fourth quarter of 2006.
In addition to the decline in actual long-term 
growth expectations, the uncertainty about 
these expectations increased somewhat between 
early 2000 and 2004, although it has since 
declined again (see Chart 24). Recalling the 
fact that aggregate uncertainty may be 
decomposed into average individual uncertainty 
and disagreement among forecasters about the 
point forecasts, it appears that the profile of 
overall uncertainty has been driven by a 
combination of changes in the individual 
assessment of uncertainty and changes in the 
degree of disagreement between individuals 
(although the latter remained relatively low). 
The relatively low level of disagreement is also 
reflected in the small differences between the 
combined forecast uncertainty and the average 
individual uncertainty.
Beyond the decline in point estimates of long-
term growth and the evolution of uncertainty, 
we also consider the balance of risks surrounding 
long-term growth expectations. The balance of 
risks to long-term growth expectations has 
generally been assessed to be on the downside 
(see Chart 25). To some extent, the fact that 
risks were judged to be almost permanently on 
the downside can be seen as consistent with the 
Chart 23 Percentage of SPF respondents 
reporting long-term GDP growth 
expectations within certain ranges
(percentages)
Source: ECB calculations.
Chart 24 Uncertainty surrounding SPF 

















































between 2.0% and 2.5%
more than 2.5%
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
4 SPF  LONG-TERM 
EXPECTATIONS44
ECB 
Occasional Paper No 59
April 2007
gradual downward revision of point estimates. 
Furthermore, the skew indicator was at its 
smallest shortly after respondents had started to 
revise down their long-term growth expectations 
in 2001. Perhaps, at that time, they felt that the 
downward revision of their point long-term 
growth expectations removed the downward 
risks. However, the subsequent weakness in 
growth may have forced them to re-evaluate the 
balance of risks. The qualitative comments that 
SPF respondents provide suggest that the 
overall risk assessment of longer-term GDP 
growth is underpinned by a number of factors. 
For example, in the euro area, unfavourable 
demographic developments in terms of lower 
growth in the working age population will 
become a major source of downward pressure 
on the longer-term potential output.53 To 
partially offset such a negative impact, labour 
utilisation has to be stimulated (e.g. by 
increasing participation rates of women and 
older workers and by lowering the structural 
unemployment rate). However, this is largely 
dependant on the progress made in structural 
reforms in labour and product markets, and 
some SPF participants have expressed concerns 
about the lack of determination euro area 
countries show in implementing these necessary 
reforms.
We also consider the link between SPF 
respondents’ long-term growth expectations 
and long-term inflation-linked bond yields. 
One may recall that yields on conventional 
bonds broadly correspond to the sum of three 
components: a real yield, some expected 
inflation and a risk premium. The real yield and 
the expected inflation represent the two forms 
of compensation investors require: a real return 
on the investment and compensation for the 
purchasing power lost as a result of inflation. In 
contrast to conventional bonds, the yield of 
inflation-linked bonds does not include expected 
inflation and only includes the “real” component 
plus an associated real risk premium, since the 
par value and the coupon payments automatically 
adjust to changes in inflation. Although 
influenced by a host of factors, the real yield is 
determined primarily by the economy’s overall 
demand and supply of capital, which tends to 
follow the economy’s overall rate of growth.
Indeed, over the period for which data are available 
(i.e. since early 2002), there has been a broad co-
movement between SPF long-term growth 
expectations and the yield on inflation-linked 
bonds, although there has been some decoupling 
in 2006. This broad co-movement could reflect 
Chart 25 The balance of risks around 
long-term growth expectations
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Source: ECB calculations.
Note: There were no questions related to longer-term real GDP 
growth forecasts in the 1999Q2, 1999Q3, 1999Q4, 2000Q2, 
2000Q3 and 2000Q4 survey rounds.
Chart 26 Long-term growth expectations 
and the yield from long-term index-linked 
bonds
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53 See  ECB  (2005a).45
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declining long-term growth expectations from 
both professional forecasters and market 
participants. However, the scale of movement has 
been somewhat different. On the one hand, SPF 
expectations have declined (by 0.5 percentage 
point) from around 2.5% at the beginning of 2002 
to 2.0%, whilst yields on inflation-linked bond 
yields declined (by 2.3 percentage point) 
from around 3.2% to 0.9% at their lowest – see 
Chart 26. Clearly, other factors may also impact 
on yields from long-term inflation-linked bonds, 
such as technical market factors (e.g. the degree of 
liquidity and demand in the market), the premium 
investors are willing to pay to be hedged against 
inflation risk, or unexplained factors that have 
fuelled the low-bond yield conundrum described 
by Alan Greenspan, former Chairman of the Board 
of Governors of the Federal Reserve.54 Interestingly, 
according to SPF respondents, there has been a 
downward movement in both the real yield on 
long-term inflation-linked bonds and the 
probability of growth being below 2%. This may 
indicate that the long-term bond yields also reflect, 
at least in part, the markets’ perceptions of risks to 
long-term growth. 
4.3 LONG-TERM  UNEMPLOYMENT 
EXPECTATIONS
SPF respondents also provide long-term 
unemployment expectations. Following a period 
of declining expectations from 1999 to early 
2001, long-term unemployment expectations 
broadly flattened out at a level of around 7.5%, 
before declining more recently to around 7.0% 
(see Chart 27). This profile has been largely 
shared across the SPF panel, as witnessed by the 
equivalent profiles of the upper and lower 
quartiles. 
Considering Chart 28, it is clear that the profile 
of long-term unemployment expectations has 
been largely driven by revisions to the short-
term unemployment outlook.55 There seems to 
be a clear, and almost one-to-one, average 
relationship between revisions to the short-term 
outlook and those to the longer-term outlook. 
This reflects the high degree of persistence in 
the unemployment data and also suggests that 
SPF respondents perceive a high degree of 
hysteresis56, although on some occasions the 
change in the short-term expectation has moved 
in the opposite direction to the long-term 
expectation (i.e. when the observations are in 
the red quadrants of Chart 28). It has also been 
Chart 27 Evolution of long-term 
unemployment expectations
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Chart 28 Correlation between revisions to 
the short-term unemployment outlook and 
the long-term unemployment outlook
x-axis: change in long-term unemployment expectations 
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54  In a speech before the US Congress on 16 February 2005.
55  It was also considered whether there was a correlation between 
changes to long-term GDP and long-term unemployment 
expectations. However, while there appeared to be a negative 
relationship, it was not statistically significant. 
56  If there was no hysteresis in unemployment, one could expect 
revisions to longer-term unemployment expectations to be 
uncorrelated with short-term developments. 
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the case on a number of occasions that the 
revisions to the long-term expectations have 
been larger than those to the short-term 
expectations (i.e. when the observations are in 
the yellow quadrants). The blue quadrants 
indicate when the revision of the short-term 
expectation is larger than that of the long-term 
expectation. The high degree of persistence, 
however, is amplified by the substantial data 
revisions that have affected the unemployment 
statistics and, consequently, SPF forecasts over 
all horizons (see Section 2.1).
Another noteworthy feature of the longer-term 
SPF unemployment expectations is that the level 
of disagreement between forecasters (as measured 
by the standard deviation of point forecasts) has 
generally been higher than their individual 
assessment of the uncertainty surrounding their 
point forecasts (as measured by the average 
standard deviation of the individual distributions). 
This can be seen clearly in Chart 29. Up until mid-
2003, individual forecasters were relatively 
confident in their own assessment of the uncertainty 
surrounding their forecast, particularly when 
assessed against the high degree of disagreement 
among forecasters about the longer-term 
unemployment forecast. Since mid-2003, there 
has been a further small decline in the level of 
disagreement, while the individual assessment of 
uncertainty has remained broadly stable. Unlike 
inflation or real GDP growth which can be 
anchored by monetary policy or potential output 
expectations, long-term unemployment 
expectations may differ substantially from one 
forecaster to the next according to how different 
information is weighted in forming expectations 
or, alternatively, to the type of model used to 
assess its likely future evolution. This reflects the 
fact that, in the longer term, unemployment rates 
are determined by underlying labour market 
features. Therefore, participants’ assessments of 
the likelihood and magnitude of structural reforms 
play an important role in terms of both the level of 
their longer-term unemployment rate forecasts 
and the risks surrounding their forecasts.
Finally, the balance of risks assigned to longer-
term unemployment expectations has generally 
been assessed to be on the upside. Chart 30 shows 
the perceived balance of risks, proxied by the 
difference between the mean of the aggregate 
distribution and the average of the point forecasts. 
This continuous perception of an upward balance 
of risks, despite revisions to the point forecast, 
may be due to respondents’ scepticism that 
required structural reforms will take place in the 
labour market. Indeed, the factor most frequently 
cited by SPF respondents as having an impact on 
their long-term unemployment expectations is 
Chart 29 Uncertainty surrounding SPF 
longer-term unemployment rate forecasts
(percentage points)
Source: ECB calculations.
Note: There were no questions related to longer-term 
unemployment forecasts in the 1999 Q2, 1999 Q3, 1999 Q4, 
2000 Q2, 2000 Q3 and 2000 Q4 survey rounds.
Chart 30 The balance of risks around 
long-term unemployment
skew (i.e. implied mean of the aggregate distribution
minus average forecast; in p.p.)
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the prospect (or lack) of structural reforms in the 
labour market.
5  CONCLUDING REMARKS AND FUTURE 
SPF RESEARCH 
Since its inception, the ECB SPF has led to the 
accumulation of a valuable set of data on 
expectations about inflation, real GDP growth 
and unemployment in the euro area from a large 
panel of professional forecasters. Whilst the 
number of observations is still small, a number 
of interesting conclusions can be drawn from 
this first assessment of the SPF results. First, in 
terms of actual forecast performance, the SPF 
has been broadly in line with other comparable 
surveys of forecasters (such as Consensus 
Economics). More specifically, this implies 
that, over the period under consideration (first 
quarter of 1999 to the fourth quarter of 2006), 
inflation has tended to be underpredicted to a 
significant extent, whilst growth has tended to 
be overpredicted, albeit to a lesser extent. 
Interestingly, there is little systematic difference 
between the performance of panel members 
irrespective of whether they are from the 
financial or non-financial sector or of the 
country in which they are based. Second, the 
SPF has also enabled us to measure forecasters’ 
assessment of the uncertainty surrounding their 
point forecasts. The analysis suggests that, in 
line with their point forecast errors, SPF 
participants may not have accurately assessed 
the uncertainty surrounding their forecasts. For 
example, the one-year ahead inflation outcome 
has nearly always been in the upper half of the 
aggregate probability distribution. As regards 
the level of uncertainty, the pattern of short-
term uncertainty perceived by SPF participants 
has been broadly stable for both inflation and 
unemployment since the start of the SPF. In 
some contrast, the SPF indicates a higher degree 
of variability for short-term GDP growth, 
especially during the period 2002-03. Lastly, 
the SPF also enables us to consider different 
aspects of participants’ longer-term expectations. 
One key feature of this long-term picture is 
the stable anchoring of long-term inflation 
expectations at a level in line with the definition 
of price stability adopted by the ECB Governing 
Council, which may be read as a sign of the 
ECB’s credibility.
This study has provided an initial assessment of 
the SPF data on euro area macroeconomic 
expectations. However, the main questions that 
have been addressed will clearly need to be 
looked into again once more surveys have been 
carried out and more data have been collected. 
In particular, our analysis has been conducted 
over a period that arguably does not yet 
constitute one full business cycle if measured 
from the peak in euro area GDP growth in 
mid-2000. A more reliable assessment of the 
performance of the SPF forecasters would be 
based on not just one but several complete euro 
area business cycles. This would be particularly 
justified given the uncertainties about the 
structure and functioning of the euro area 
economy and that SPF participants have had to 
learn about the shocks impacting on the 
economy, as well as the mechanisms by which 
they are propagated to inflation, growth 
and unemployment. A main focus of future 
research should therefore be to re-examine – 
with the benefit of greater hindsight – the 
predictive accuracy of the SPF macroeconomic 
expectations and density forecasts and to check 
further the robustness of the main results 
established here. 
One important additional area of research that 
has not been pursued in this paper is to attempt 
to understand more fully the economic forces 
determining macroeconomic expectations and, 
in this regard, to assess more formally the 
extent to which they deviate from the full-
information or rational paradigm. In assessing 
euro area macroeconomic developments, the 
SPF panel members face a number of 
uncertainties, including model estimation and 
inference problems. This may give rise to 
deviations from the knowledge that is imputed 
to agents under the more extreme versions of 
the Rational Expectations Hypothesis (REH – 
see Sargent, 1993). For the US economy, a 
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been undertaken using panels of professional 
forecasters similar to the ECB SPF.57 In general, 
such studies have not been conclusive, although 
the balance of evidence appears to sway slightly 
in favour of less than full rationality. Clearly, 
while the still relatively small time-dimension 
of the SPF sample means that such work must 
be put on hold for now, it will be of great 
interest to consider the “efficiency” of the SPF 
expectations. In particular, future work should 
focus on trying to assess the extent to which 
panel members have (or have not) optimally 
made use of the available information, including 
their own past forecast errors, when forming 
their expectations.58 As the SPF panel members 
are “professional” forecasters, who may have 
access to a lot of relevant macroeconomic data 
and models, it will also be interesting to 
compare the efficiency of their expectations 
with that of other agents in the economy, 
including households. Recent research using 
US data has shown some surprising results in 
this regard, in particular that household 
expectations compare reasonably favourably 
with those of professional forecasters (see, for 
example, Thomas, 1999). 
Another direction for future work would be to 
examine more fully the heterogeneity of the 
SPF panel. For example, do some forecasters 
appear to be less biased, more rational or learn 
more quickly about likely future economic 
events than others? In the area of forecast 
uncertainty, this study has focused only on the 
evaluation of the aggregate density forecasts. It 
would therefore be of interest to conduct an 
evaluation of the density forecasts of individual 
panel members in order to assess whether some 
members of the panel are better and more able 
to assess accurately macroeconomic risks than 
others.
A final direction for future work on the SPF 
data could be to consider their introduction into 
macroeconomic models in order to capture the 
impact of forward-looking behaviour on 
economic variables. As discussed in Carroll 
(2001), macroeconomists have devoted little 
effort to modelling actual empirical expectations 
data in recent decades; instead they have tended 
to assume all agents are rational. However, the 
increasing availability of datasets such as the 
SPF creates the opportunity to understand and 
model much more realistically the mechanisms 
whereby expectations are formed and how they 
may impact on the macroeconomy. For example, 
a number of studies have been undertaken using 
survey data that test for a forward-looking 
component in the inflation process. There are 
numerous other examples of the relevance of 
inflation expectations from a central bank’s 
perspective. Most notably, inflation expectations 
can be viewed as a determinant of money 
demand and they are likely to play an important 
role in the monetary transmission mechanism. 
In the recent literature on monetary policy 
rules, inflation expectations have also been 
posited to be among the key arguments in a 
central bank’s reaction function (Taylor, 1999). 
Of course, the role of expectations in economic 
modelling extends far beyond inflation and 
monetary policy; hence, the SPF data could 
also eventually play a role in helping to model 
important real variables, such as consumption 
and investment.
57  See, for example, Thomas (1999), Brown and Maital (1981) and 
Baghestani and Kianian (1993). Keane and Runkle (1990) do 
not reject rationality, while Zarnowitz (1985) finds that forecasts 
of other variables, except prices, tend to be rational. See 
Croushore (1997) for an overview of results investigating the 
Livingston Survey in the United States.
58   For a further discussion of efficiency of expectations, see 
Thomas (1999) and some of the references cited therein.49
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ANNEX 1 
IS THERE BIAS IN THE SPF FORECAST RESULTS? 
EVIDENCE FROM A PANEL DATA ANALYSIS
Section 2.2 presented some tests for 
unbiasedness performed on aggregate or 
average survey responses. Some authors have 
criticised the use of average responses to 
perform these tests since the aggregation of 
survey responses may introduce at least two 
types of bias. First, Figlewski and Wachtel 
(1983) observed that the use of average survey 
responses introduces a specification bias. 
Indeed, if all forecasters were rational (i.e. they 
were to all pass the bias test regression), it 
would mean that the differences between 
individual forecasts would only be the result of 
differences in private information sets. 
However, because each forecaster cannot use 
the private information of other individuals, 
Figlewski and Wachtel show that the average 
forecast is correlated with the average forecast 
error (which contains the private information 
variables) and therefore is not rational. This 
correlation would introduce a substantial bias 
into the parameters of the test regression. 
Second, average forecasts may mask systematic 
individual biases and thus, lead to a false 
acceptance of unbiasedness (Keane and Runkle, 
1990). 
The aggregation bias is indeed quite significant 
and can be simply illustrated by running three 
types of regression and comparing the resulting 
coefficients with those presented in Section 
2.2.59 Regression 1 uses survey averages, as in 
Section 2.2, regression 2 involves doing a 
separate regression for each individual SPF 
forecaster and taking the mean of the estimated 
coefficients, and regression 3 uses pooled 
(combined time series, cross section) data. 
Table 10 reports the estimated α and β 
coefficients resulting from these regressions, 
using the one-year ahead forecast of inflation.
Table 10 shows that β is closer to unity when 
using SPF average survey responses, so that the 
aggregation of SPF replies actually increases 
the likelihood of accepting the null hypothesis 
of forecast unbiasedness.60 The upward bias in 
the β estimator of the regression using survey 
averages appears to be quite severe and justifies 
the attempt to use pooled data in a cross-section 
regression to accurately test for bias in SPF 
results. 
Using individual forecaster level data could 
therefore overcome aggregation problems by 
modelling differences in behaviour across each 
individual forecaster (see also Lahiri and Liu, 
2004). In this Annex, we run similar bias tests 
to those of Section 2.2 using the following 
equation:
AF ti i i t i t =+ + αβ ε
where Fit is the forecast of forecaster i made for 
time t.
59  In what follows, we used a balanced panel (i.e. for each variable/
horizon, we only use results from those who have replied in 
each survey round for that variable/horizon). As only a very 
small number of panellists have replied in every round, to 
ensure that a sufficient number of responses were available, a 
simple linear interpolation was made (provided that the gap 
between responses was no more than two rounds). The resulting 
balanced panel contains approximately 30 respondents for the 
one-year ahead rolling horizon and just over 20 for the two-year 
ahead rolling horizon.
60  A similar aggregation bias was found by Figlewski and Wachtel 
(1981) in a study of the Livingston survey data on inflation 
expectations and by Urich and Wachtel (1984) in a study on 
money supply expectations.
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Table 10 Regression test for bias of one-year ahead forecast of inflation
Estimated coefficients αβ
1. SPF average survey responses 1.03 0.68 
2. Individual means 1.85 0.20
3. Pooled data 1.95 0.14
Source: ECB calculations.50
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Since the dependent variable (At), i.e. the 
observed outcome of the forecast variable, is 
the same for all individual forecasters, forecast 
errors are likely to be highly correlated across 
forecasters due to unforeseen aggregate shocks 
to the economy, and thus common to all survey 
participants. Moreover, each individual forecast 
error (εit) suffers from autocorrelation due to 
the overlapping forecast horizons noted in 
Section 2.2. Hence, the estimation was 
performed using feasible GLS, allowing for 
autoregressive and heteroskedastic residuals. 
As highlighted above, the panel data analysis 
was carried out using a balanced panel, 
constructed where necessary by linear 
interpolation of missing forecasts. By doing so, 
we are imposing a specific forecast generating 
process on the individual forecaster that may 
influence fully-fledged tests for rational 
expectations of the SPF forecasts. However, as 
our aim here is to measure only the statistical 
significance of the forecast bias, we implement 
this simplifying method. 
As a first step, we check whether the average 
results of the constructed balanced panel are 
comparable with those of the full sample 
presented in Section 2.2. Table 11 reports the 
results of the bias tests performed using the 
average results of the balanced panel, and 
shows that they are indeed broadly similar to 
those of the unbalanced panel, as presented in 
Section 2.2. More precisely, the test results 
indicate a significant bias in the inflation 
forecasts over all horizons, as well as in the 
two-year ahead real GDP growth forecasts. The 
bias does not appear to be significant for 
unemployment forecasts or for one-year ahead 
real GDP growth forecasts.
Table 11 Results from bias test using averages of balanced SPF panel data
Variable αβ R2 F-test (p-value) μ (p-value)
Inflation one year ahead 1.03 (0.40) 1) 0.68 (0.24) 0.12 0.000 0.000
Inflation two years ahead 3.51 (0.77) 1) -0.73 (0.44) 1) 0.06 0.000 0.000
GDP one year ahead -0.35 (0.63) 1.08 (0.36) 0.28 0.691 0.603
GDP two years ahead 4.05 (1.47) 1) -0.95 (0.60) 1) 0.07 0.011 0.003
Unemployment one year ahead 7.71 (1.07) 1) 0.08 (0.11) 1) 0.01 0.000 0.106
Unemployment two years ahead 11.76 (0.83) 1) -0.40 (0.09) 1) 0.38 0.000 0.933
Source: ECB calculations.
Note: Standard errors are in brackets (corrected using the Newey-West procedure). 
1) Indicates that the coefficient is significantly different from the null hypothesis (i.e. α = 0 or β = 1) at the 10% level or lower. The 
p-value is from the F-test. Bold indicates rejection of the unbiasedness hypothesis at the 10% level or lower.
Table 12 Results from bias tests using pooled data of the SPF balanced panel
Variable αβ μ  (p-value)
Inflation one year ahead 1.94 (0.05) 1) 0.14 (0.03) 1) 0.000
Inflation two years ahead 2.36 (0.07) 1) -0.09 (0.04) 1) 0.000
GDP one year ahead 1.93 (0.11) 1) 0.14 (0.03) 1) 0.309
GDP two years ahead 2.12 (0.17) 1) -0.07 (0.06) 1) 0.000
Unemployment one year ahead 7.13 (0.16) 1) 0.13 (0.02) 1) 0.000
Unemployment two years ahead 8.32 (0.14) 1) -0.03 (0.01) 1) 0.000
Source: ECB calculations.
Note: Standard errors are in brackets. 
1) Indicates that the coefficient is significantly different from the null hypothesis (i.e. α = 0 or β = 1) at the 10% level or lower. Bold 
indicates rejection of the unbiasedness hypothesis at the 10% level or better.51
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Table 12 reports the corresponding results of 
the bias tests using the pooled data of that same 
balanced panel. Clearly, the probabilities of 
SPF results being unbiased are now equal to 
zero for all variables, with the exception of 
GDP one year ahead. Furthermore, α > 0 and 
β < 1 in all cases. This suggests that aggregating 
SPF results introduces a significant bias into 
the test results by masking systematic individual 
biases. However, it should be borne in mind 
that forecast bias results for the SPF are likely 
to be sensitive to the small sample size and 
should thus be considered with caution.
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ANNEX 2
A CLOSER LOOK AT INDIVIDUAL FORECASTER 
QUALITY
This Annex highlights a number of alternative 
indicators for assessing the “quality” of SPF 
forecasters and provides further and more 
detailed information on the performance of 
each individual SPF forecaster. Presented in the 
table below, these indicators provide a more 
comprehensive picture of the behaviour of 
individual panel members. They include the 
response rate, forecast accuracy and the degree 
to which a specific forecaster lags or leads the 
rest of the panel.
Response rates: the table shows (in the second, 
third and fourth columns respectively) the number 
of responses from each forecaster in each SPF 
round and more specifically the number of 
responses to the questions on their point forecasts 
and the underlying probability distributions as a 
percentage of the total number of possible 
responses. While no forecaster has an absolute 
100% response rate, quite a number have 
responded consistently to most of the questions 
asked. For example, 11 have responded at least 
90% of the time to the questions regarding their 
point forecasts, and 32 have responded at least 
75% of the time. The equivalent figures for the 
probability distributions are 10 and 27.
Accuracy: in terms of forecast error statistics, the 
table presents the rankings with regard to the 
RMSE statistics across the three different 
variables (inflation, growth and unemployment) 
and two horizons (one-year and two-year ahead) 
in order to consider whether any forecaster has 
performed significantly above or below the 
average (see the fifth and sixth columns).61 
Taking the upper and lower quartiles as the 
thresholds, based on the experience to date, seven 
forecasters (numbers 22, 23, 24, 60, 80, 93 and 
96) have better-than-average RMSE statistics (in 
the upper quartile) for at least four of the different 
six combinations of variables/horizons 
considered. However, it should be noted that 
none of these forecasters provided answers to the 
rolling horizon questions during the earlier 
rounds of the SPF when errors were relatively 
high. There were also five forecasters (numbers 
3, 19, 28, 71 and 87) who have worse-than-
average RMSE statistics (in the lower quartile) 
for four or more of the different variables/
horizons for which they provided forecasts. Of 
these, one forecaster withdrew from the panel 
after the round for the fourth quarter of 2003. 
Overall, even though a small number of 
forecasters perform above or below average 
across a number of the variables and horizons, 
none do so for all variables and all horizons. 
Further evidence and experience would therefore 
be required before we are able to systematically 
identify good performers. 
Leading or lagging the group: The seventh and 
eighth columns of the table show the extent to 
which changes in individual forecasts lead or 
lag changes in the average SPF forecast. 
Forecasters systematically lagging the average 
could be slow to adjust their views to reflect 
new information or they could be merely 
updating their forecasts with the consensus. On 
the other hand, if forecasters are consistently 
ahead of or at least contemporaneous with the 
average SPF forecast, it would suggest that 
their forecasts are indeed being updated to 
reflect new information.62 In any case, the 
results show that no forecaster shows a positive 
and significant contemporaneous or leading 
correlation with changes in the average forecast 
61  Only forecasters who have responded at least ten times for a 
specific variable/horizon combination are taken into account in 
the ranking for that specific variable/horizon combination.
62    However, a number of caveats to this analysis should be 
highlighted. First, given that the majority of respondents do not 
reply all the time, the change in their forecasts is put at zero if they 
did not reply in the previous round. Second, perhaps it is not the 
correlation with the average SPF forecast but the correlation with 
the actual value that matters. However, given that the actual 
outcome is not known until approximately 12 months later and 
that many things could happen in the meantime, the correlation 
with changes in the average forecast is considered, as it should 
contain most of the information that has become available since 
the last round. Lastly, persistence in changes in the forecasts, 
arising possibly either from the inertia of some forecasters or from 
persistence in shocks, suggests these correlations should be 
interpreted with caution. This is particularly the case for the 
unemployment forecasts (both one and two years ahead) as the 
changes in the average forecast are significantly correlated with 
changes in the previous round. Thus, a positive correlation with 
lagged changes may not only indicate that a forecaster is following 
the consensus, but also that shocks may be correlated.53
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for all six variables/horizons,63  although a 
couple show a positive and significant (more 
than 0.4 percentage point) correlation for five 
of the horizons/variables (numbers 3 and 4). 
Similarly, no forecasters consistently lag 
changes in the average SPF forecast, although 
one does lag for three variables/horizons 
(number 41). Lastly, it should be highlighted 
that no forecaster was a “contrarian” forecaster, 
as none had a negative and significant 
contemporaneous correlation with changes in 
the average forecast.
To sum up, considering the different aspects of 
forecaster quality (response rate, forecast 
accuracy, etc.) and bearing in mind the short 
sample for which actual outcomes can be 
compared against forecasts, it is difficult to 
highlight conclusively and systematically 
“good” or “bad” forecasters. This is especially 
the case when one considers that the period 
since 1999 has been characterised by a number 
of shocks, in particular to oil prices. Given that 
these, to a large extent could not be forecast, a 
forecaster that has performed particularly well 
over the sample period might actually have 
performed relatively poorly in the absence of 
such shocks and vice versa. 
63  The results here are shown for six variants: the one and two-year 
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Table 13 Alternative indicators of forecaster quality
Forecaster Response 
rate – rounds 1)
(%)
Response 



















SPF 0/6 0/6 6/6 2/6
 1 81 78 79 0/6 0/6 4/6 2/6
 2 69 64 66 3/6 0/6 2/6 1/6
 3 72 64 68 0/6 4/6 5/6 2/6
 4 91 87 85 2/6 1/6 5/6 0/6
 5 88 84 87 1/6 0/6 2/5 1/5
 6 6 66
 7 94 75 0 0/6 2/6 4/5 1/5
 8 0 00
 9 81 80 80 0/6 3/6 4/6 2/6
10 75 67 67 0/6 1/6 2/6 0/6
11 91 84 81 0/6 3/6 3/5 0/5
12 0 00
13 3 33
14 94 89 69 0/6 2/6 3/6 1/6
15 81 82 82 2/6 0/6 1/6 0/6
16 84 83 83 2/6 0/6 2/6 0/6
17 81 77 71 2/6 3/6 0/5 0/5
18 34 30 17
19 78 78 78 0/6 4/6 3/6 1/6
20 81 78 81 1/5 0/5 2/5 0/5
21 0 00
22 78 79 79 5/6 1/6 2/6 1/6
23 78 77 77 4/6 0/6 4/6 1/6
24 91 91 91 4/6 0/6 4/5 0/5
25 0 00
26 100 95 100 0/6 0/6 3/5 2/5
27 0 00
28 78 68 69 0/6 5/6 4/6 0/6
29 78 49 49 1/3 1/3 1/5 0/5
30 81 48 48 0/1 0/1
31 91 89 56 1/6 1/6 3/6 0/6
32 94 66 67 2/6 0/6 3/6 2/6
33 100 97 99 2/6 2/6 0/5 0/5
34 19 14 15
35 97 45 44 2/3 0/3
36 84 83 83 1/6 2/6 3/6 0/6
37 97 97 97 2/6 0/6 4/6 0/6
38 69 60 60 1/6 2/6 4/6 0/6
39 94 93 93 1/6 1/6 4/5 0/5
40 53 28 28
41 97 97 56 3/6 1/6 3/6 3/6
42 88 83 84 0/6 1/6 1/5 0/5
43 9 77
44 6 33
45 91 38 34
46 28 24 24
47 88 50 46 1/3 0/3
48 84 55 44 3/6 2/6 1/6 0/6
49 38 32 27 1/3 1/3 0/4 1/4
50 59 49 49 1/6 3/6 1/5 0/5
51 0 00
52 69 67 68 2/6 0/6 4/6 0/6
53 66 64 63 0/6 1/6 4/6 1/6
54 97 95 94 2/6 1/6 3/5 0/5
55 28 24 23
56 91 81 82 2/6 2/6 4/6 1/6
57 91 46 20 0/1 0/1
58 3 21
59 88 85 80 0/6 1/6 3/6 0/6
60 72 72 72 4/6 0/6 1/6 1/6
61 75 64 64 1/6 1/6 3/5 0/5
62 38 17 1755
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Table 13 Alternative indicators of forecaster quality (cont’d)
Forecaster Response 
rate – rounds 1)
(%)
Response 



















SPF 0/6 0/6 6/6 2/6
63 84 59 49 1/2 1/2 0/4 0/4
64 41 31 28 0/1 0/1
65 31 26 27
66 16 14 9
67 72 53 43 1/6 3/6 1/5 2/5
68 59 44 43 0/2 0/2
69 0 00
70 81 73 73 3/6 0/6 1/6 0/6
71 50 49 49 0/6 4/6 2/6 2/6
72 63 61 60 0/5 3/5 4/6 0/6
73 100 54 54 0/3 1/3
74 0 00
75 0 00




80 72 72 32 5/6 0/6 3/5 1/5
81 0 00
82 53 44 20 2/3 1/3 0/4 0/4
83 0 00
84 63 48 49 1/2 0/2
85 100 70 61 0/4 3/4
86 3 33
87 59 57 57 0/6 4/6 3/6 1/6
88 44 42 42 0/3 2/3 3/6 0/6
89 97 98 98 1/6 1/6 3/6 0/6
90 97 93 92 0/6 1/6 4/6 2/6
91 91 78 81 2/6 0/6 2/6 2/6
92 91 73 65 1/6 1/6 3/6 0/6
93 97 88 89 5/6 0/6 3/6 0/6
94 97 95 97 0/6 2/6 3/6 0/6
95 97 97 97 0/6 1/6 3/6 2/6
96 84 64 63 5/5 0/5 2/6 0/6
97 38 38 39 0/5 0/5
98 19 20 15
99 25 27 27
100 13 11 11
Notes: Strikethrough and darker background denotes that the forecasters are no longer active members of the panel, i.e. they have not 
replied in any of the last eight rounds.
1) “Response rate – rounds” denotes the percentage of survey rounds to which the forecaster has responded.
2) “Response rate – point forecasts” denotes the percentage of questions on their point forecasts to which the forecaster has responded. 
For example, in most rounds respondents are asked to provide 15 point forecasts (three variables for three calendar-year horizons and 
two rolling horizons)
3) “Response rate – probability distributions” denotes the percentage of questions on the probability distributions surrounding their 
point forecasts to which the forecaster has responded. For example, in most rounds respondents are asked to provide 15 probability 
distributions (three variables for three calendar-year horizons and two rolling horizons)
4) “Forecast ranking – top quartile” denotes the number of times the forecaster ranks in the top quartile in terms of RMSE for the one 
and two-year ahead rolling horizons for the three variables. Note: forecasters are only ranked if they have replied at least ten times. 
Hence “2/4” denotes that a forecaster has only responded a minimum of ten times for four out the possible six forecasts (two horizons 
and three variables) and was in the top quartile for two of these.
5) “Forecast ranking – bottom quartile” as above, but referring to the bottom quartile.
6) “Leading/contemporaneous with aggregate” denotes whether changes in the individual’s forecasts were either leading or contemporaneously 
correlated with changes in the aggregate forecast. Note: the correlation is only calculated if a forecaster has replied at least ten times. Hence 
“2/4” denotes that a forecaster has only responded a minimum of ten times for four out the possible six forecasts (two horizons and three 
variables) and the correlation coefficient was significant, either leading or contemporaneously, for two of these.
7) “Lagging aggregate” denotes whether changes in the individual’s forecasts were lagging changes in the aggregate forecast. Note: the 
correlation is only calculated if a forecaster has replied at least ten times. Hence, “2/4” denotes that a forecaster has only responded a 
minimum of ten times for four out the possible six forecasts (two horizons and three variables) and the correlation coefficient (for 
lagged changes) was significant for two of these.
ANNEX 256
ECB 
Occasional Paper No 59
April 2007
ANNEX 3
THE PROBABILITY FORECASTS FROM THE ECB 
SPF: A PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT 
In addition to providing point estimates, SPF 
respondents provide information on their 
assessment of the uncertainty surrounding these 
point estimates. As was the case with the point 
forecasts, it may also be insightful to evaluate 
the accuracy and reliability of these assessments 
of uncertainty. In this Annex, we apply a 
method, known as the “probability integral 
transform”, proposed by Diebold, Gunther and 
Tay (1998) to assess the information on forecast 
uncertainty that can be obtained from the ECB 
SPF. After briefly describing the intuition 
behind this approach to evaluating distribution 
forecasts, the forecast densities (or probability 
distributions) for each of the three variables 
(inflation, unemployment and GDP) and over 
two horizons (one-year and two-year ahead) are 
evaluated. The sample period, which ranges 
from the first quarter of 1999 to the fourth 
quarter of 2006, is relatively short and thus 
provides more of an illustration of an evaluation 
framework that can be maintained in order to 
assess the SPF distributions, as such series 
accumulate over time. In particular, a 
considerably larger sample would be required 
in order to carry out formal tests on the 
optimality of the SPF forecast densities. This 
first analysis is therefore more heuristic, based 
on graphical analysis and simple statistical 
tests. 
THE PROBABILITY INTEGRAL TRANSFORM
At first glance, the problem of evaluating 
density forecasts seems very challenging. In the 
case of point forecasts, one can observe the 
corresponding realisation which serves as a 
benchmark for predictive evaluation. However, 
in the case of density forecasts, there appears to 
be no such observable benchmark that could 
facilitate a test of how closely reported densities 
correspond to the unobservable true density of 
the variable under consideration. Moreover, the 
true density underlying the forecast variable 
may exhibit structural changes, thereby further 
complicating the evaluation process.
Drawing on a related literature evaluating 
interval forecasts, recent advances in forecast 
evaluation have begun to address the problem 
of how to evaluate density forecasts.64 The 
basic idea is to check whether the actual 
realisations of the forecast variable are, on 
average, consistent with the forecast densities. 
To check this, Diebold, Gunther and Tay (1998) 
propose the estimation of the probability 
integral transform (Zt) of the reported empirical 
densities.  Zt  is defined as the cumulative 
probability distribution function evaluated at 
the actual outcome, Xt, for the forecast period 
in question, i.e. 
 




In other words, Zt gives the estimated probability 
of the variable being less than or equal to the 
actual outcome (observed only ex post) 
according to the predictive forecast density. 
Diebold, Gunther and Tay (1998) show how the 
properties of Zt depend on how closely the 
reported densities approximate the true 
underlying density driving the variable under 
study. In particular, if survey respondents 
accurately assess the true underlying 
probabilities and their evolution through time, 
Diebold, Gunther and Tay (1998) show that Zt 
will be a uniformly, independent and identically 
distributed random variable bounded between 
zero and unity, i.e. Zt uiid [0, 1].65 Conversely, 
if forecasters have not accurately assessed the 
shape and location of the true density, the Zt 
64    For applications of the probability integral transform, see 
Diebold, Gunther and Tay (1998) who address the univariate 
case. Diebold, Hahn and Tay (1999) and Clements and Smith 
(2000) consider multivariate density forecasts, while Clements 
(2003) proposes an alternative approach based on derived event 
probability forecasts. Diebold, Tay and Wallis (1999) evaluate 
the density forecasts for inflation from the Federal Reserve 
Bank of Philadelphia’s Survey of Professional Forecasters.
65   A uiid [0, 1] random variable is uniformly, identically and 
independently distributed over the interval [0, 1]. One important 
statistical feature implied by the independence criteria is that 
the variable will not be serially correlated. 57
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series will display non-uniformities that 
highlight the “discrepancies” between the 
reported and true densities. For example, 
suppose that forecasters correctly assess the 
mean of future inflation. However, they 
mistakenly assume a Normal distribution while 
the true distribution actually has higher-than-
normal probabilities of extreme outcomes (i.e. 
“fat tails”). Under such circumstances, 
respondents will not have assigned sufficient 
probability to outcomes in the tails of the 
distribution. Hence, there will tend to be many 
more realisations of inflation taking on extreme 
values than predicted by respondents’ 
distributions. Consequently, reflecting the 
excessively low probabilities assigned by 
respondents to outcomes at the extreme of the 
distribution, there will also be a non-uniform 
clustering of Zt towards the extremes of the 
[0, 1] interval. In addition, reflecting the 
excessively high probability assigned by 
respondents to outcomes in the middle of the 
distribution, there will tend to be a non-uniform 
clustering of the Zt series towards the middle of 
the [0, 1] interval. In describing the distribution 
for the probability integral transforms for such 
non-optimal density forecasts, Diebold, Gunther 
and Tay (1998) refer to a “butterfly” shape. 
As regards the independence criterion, it is in 
line with the notion that forecasters are making 
use of available information sets, which include 
any past values of Zt that were available to 
respondents when the density forecasts were 
constructed. For one-step ahead forecast 
densities, this implies that the Zt  series is 
independent, while for h-step ahead forecast 
densities, the Zt series should be, at most, h-1 
dependent (i.e. there should be, at most, serial 
correlation of order h-1) (see Diebold, Gunther 
and Tay, 1998). 
The SPF density forecasts can therefore be 
evaluated by assessing whether and how closely 
the empirical distribution of Zt corresponds to 
the uiid [0, 1] distribution that would arise 
under the assumption that the density forecasts 
were optimal.66 One of the attractions of the 
above approach is that it requires no information 
on the model or other approach used by survey 
respondents to assess uncertainty. Rather, the 
analysis is based solely on the reported 
distributions relative to the realised inflation 
outcome. An additional advantage is that 
the above test of density forecasts is valid, even 
if the true densities are time varying. 
Notwithstanding these strengths, a robust 
assessment of density forecasts based on this 
approach requires relatively large samples 
which are often not available in macroeconomic 
contexts (see Pesaran and Skouras, 2002). 
Aside from small sample issues, an additional 
practical difficulty also emerges in the current 
context of using the ECB SPF data to estimate 
Zt. In particular, SPF respondents report discrete 
distributions which assign probabilities to 
various intervals that are specified in the survey 
questionnaire. Hence, given that the realised 
inflation outcome can sometimes fall within 
one of the surveyed intervals, it is necessary to 
approximate Zt in some way. For illustrative 
purposes, Chart 31 displays the approximation 
of Zt for the specific case of the probability 
distribution for the rate of inflation in March 
2004, as surveyed in the second quarter of 2002 
(i.e. the two-year ahead inflation forecast). As 
can be seen from the chart, respondents assigned 
most of the probability mass to outcomes within 
the 1.5%-1.9% range, while at the same time 
assigning a somewhat greater probability to 
outcomes above this range compared with 
the probability assigned to lower outcomes. Zt, 
according to equation A3.1, provides the 
estimated probability – implied by the reported 
distribution – of inflation being below its 
realised value of 1.7%. This is calculated as the 
sum of the probabilities assigned to all ranges 
below 1.5% (i.e. 0.4%+2.7%+12.8%) plus some 
fraction of the probability assigned to the 1.5%-
1.9% range (40.5%). In principle, the reported 
distribution does not provide precise information 
on how to estimate this fraction. In the empirical 
application below, this fraction is estimated by 
assuming that the total probability mass within 
66  Peseran and Skouras (2002) point out that the uiid property 
represents a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for the 
optimality of the underlying predictive distribution. 
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the range is uniformly distributed across each 
of the five possible outcomes within that range. 
Hence, when inflation is rounded to one decimal 
point, of the five possible outcomes within the 
1.5%-1.9% range, three are less than or equal to 
the actual inflation outcome in March 2004 
(1.7%). This implies an estimate of 60% (or 
three-fifths) for the fraction of the probability 
that should be included in the calculation of 
Zt.67 As shown in the chart, Zt is then estimated 
to take on a value of 0.402 under these 
assumptions.
EMPIRICAL APPLICATION TO THE ECB SPF
In this section, we report the estimated 
probability integral transforms for the ECB 
SPF aggregate density forecasts for inflation, 
GDP growth and the unemployment rate. The 
analysis is illustrated using the rolling one and 
two-year ahead density forecasts for each of the 
variables. For the one-year ahead forecast 
densities, the sample size (n) corresponds to 
only 28 observations for each variable, i.e. 
inflation, GDP growth and the unemployment 
rate, respectively. This is the sample size (n=28) 
considered by Diebold, Tay and Wallis (1999); 
however, in that study, the observations were 
not overlapping as in this case. For the 2-year 
ahead forecasts, the corresponding number of 
observations is reduced further to only 24 
observations. The relatively small sample size 
highlights the clearly illustrative nature of the 
exercise. It is also important to underline here 
that, because we focus on year-on-year rates, 
the observations overlap. Thus, for example, 
the year-on-year rate in the second quarter of 
2004, which is the sum of the rate of change in 
first and second quarters of 2004 and the third 
and fourth quarters of 2003, to a large extent 
overlaps with the year-on-year rate in the first 
quarter of 2004, which is the sum of the rate of 
change in the first quarter of 2004 and the last 
three quarters of 2003. Thus, a shock in any 
specific quarter may affect the year-on-year 
rate for a number of quarters. 
Thus, as discussed above, there is likely to be 
some serial dependence in the estimated Zt  
series, reflecting the multi-step (i.e. one or two-
year ahead) nature of these density forecasts. 
Moreover, it is not known how deviations from 
the independence criteria impact on the 
uniformity property and vice versa. Ideally, 
under such circumstances, one way of 
proceeding (see Diebold, Gunther and Tay, 
1998) is to split the series into h sub-series that 
should be iid (e.g. using quarterly one-year 
ahead forecasts, one could have a series of 
forecasts for the first quarter of each year, a 
series of forecasts for the second quarter, etc.). 
However, the relatively small sample size 
prohibits any meaningful analysis of such sub-
series at present. For this reason, we proceed in 
Chart 31 Example: calculation of probability 
integral transform for the two-year ahead 













































March 2004 HICP = 1.7%
Z(t)  = 0.004 + 0.027 + 0.128 + (0.6)0.405
Z(t)  = 0.402
Source: ECB calculations.
67  This approach to apportioning the probability within each bin 
or forecast range seemed the most consistent with the discrete 
nature of the probability distributions that respondents are 
asked to complete as part of the SPF questionnaire, and in the 
light of the fact that inflation is normally reported as a figure 
that is rounded to one decimal point. Of course, this should not 
be seen as ruling out different assumptions should the context 
require it. For example, in Section 3, the possibility of fitting 
continuous distributions (such as a Normal distribution) to the 
discrete SPF distributions in order to estimate the mean and the 
variance is considered.59
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a more heuristic manner, examining the 
properties of Zt graphically.68  
Chart 32 plots the estimated Zt series for 
inflation, real GDP growth and the euro area 
unemployment rate for the one-year ahead 
density forecasts for the surveys conducted 
since the first quarter of 1999. In the chart, 
large values of the Zt series correspond to 
unexpectedly high realised values for each of 
the three variables. From the chart, in the case 
of the one-year ahead inflation densities, there 
is some evidence to suggest that survey 
respondents have not accurately assessed the 
uncertainty surrounding future inflation 
outcomes. In particular, for all of the surveys 
conducted between the first quarter of 1999 and 
the fourth quarter of 2005, the estimated 
probability integral transform does not appear 
to be uniformly distributed within the [0, 1] 
interval. Rather, all of the observations, save 
for the last one, fall within the upper half of the 
[0, 1] interval. This considerable persistence is 
in line with the previous finding that respondents 
inaccurately assessed the centre or location of 
the true density (i.e. their inflation forecast 
tended to be biased downwards). In other words, 
SPF respondents failed to attribute sufficiently 
high probabilities to outcomes for inflation 
above the actual realised values. A similar 
picture emerges in the case of the two-year 
ahead inflation densities (reported in Chart 33), 
with only two observations from the surveys for 
the second quarter of 2002 and the fourth 
quarter of 2004 falling into the lower half of the 
[0, 1] interval. Using a much longer time series 
for US inflation (from 1970 to the late 1990s), 
it is interesting to note that Diebold, Tay and 
Wallis came to a similar conclusion; namely 
that positive (negative) inflation surprises occur 
more (less) often than the respondents to the 
Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia’s SPF 
expect. 
Turning to the assessment of the GDP growth 
and unemployment rate densities, the estimated 
probability integral transforms suggest a 
somewhat different picture to that emerging for 
inflation. In particular, in the case of both 
variables, even in this relatively small sample, 
observed values of Zt
 appear to be drawn from 
Chart 32 Probability integral transforms for 
one-year ahead inflation, GDP growth and 
unemployment rate density forecasts
Source: ECB calculations.
Note: Horizontal axis refers to the survey date.
Chart 33 Probability integral transforms for 
two-year ahead inflation, GDP growth and 
unemployment rate density forecasts
Source: ECB calculations
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ANNEX 3
68  We also assess the extent of serial correlation in the estimated 
probability integral transforms using Ljung-Box Q statistics 
(not reported). The results confirm the presence of significant 
serial correlation in line with what would be expected given the 
multi-step nature of the forecasts. In the case of the one-year 
ahead forecasts, the serial dependence is particularly evident for 
the probability integral transforms from the unemployment and 
GDP growth rate densities for all lags up to six (the maximum 
considered given the small sample). For inflation, the evidence 
of serial correlation is weaker, particularly for orders greater 
than two. In the case of the two-year ahead densities, the 
evidence of serial dependence is weaker for both GDP growth 
and inflation, while, for the unemployment rate densities, 
considerable serial correlation remains.60
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both the upper and lower halves of the [0, 1] 
interval, although at first glance they do not 
appear independent. In the first year of the 
survey (1999), respondents appeared to have 
underestimated the probabilities of high growth 
outcomes, but underestimated the probabilities 
of lower unemployment. However, this situation 
changed in surveys from early 2000 onwards. 
For example, for both the one and two-year 
ahead density forecasts for GDP growth, the 
estimated Zt clusters around zero for most of 
the period from end-2000 to the beginning of 
2003, suggesting that respondents are likely to 
have underestimated the probabilities of lower 
GDP growth over this period. Similarly, in the 
case of the unemployment rate densities, the 
clustering and persistence of the probability 
integral transform in the upper half of the [0, 1] 
interval for surveys conducted between 2001 
and 2004 may reflect a tendency among 
respondents to underestimate the probability of 
higher unemployment rates. This finding is of 
course consistent with the previous evidence 
that they may have underestimated the risks 
associated with the general economic 
slowdown. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS
This Annex has considered the problem of how 
to evaluate the density forecasts contained in 
the ECB SPF. Using the probability integral 
transform suggested by Diebold, Gunther and 
Tay (1998), the one and two-year ahead densities 
for inflation, GDP growth and the unemployment 
rate are assessed using the density forecasts 
available from the surveys conducted since the 
first quarter of 1999. The analysis is clearly 
restricted given the small time series sample 
that is available. Nonetheless, some evidence is 
found to suggest that respondents failed to 
accurately assess the risk of higher inflation 
outcomes over this period. In addition, SPF 
respondents may also have failed to accurately 
assess the risks of lower growth and higher 
unemployment associated with the economic 
downturn. Overall, however, it would seem that 
more definitive and robust conclusions must 
await the accumulation of further data. In the 
meantime, an interesting area for further 
investigation is the evaluation of the density 
forecasts of individual panel members in order 
to assess whether some members of the panel 
are better and more accurately able to assess 
macroeconomic risks than others.61
ECB 
Occasional Paper No 59
April 2007
REFERENCES
Baghestani, H. M. and A. M. Kianian (1993), “On the Rationality of US Macroeconomic Forecasts: 
Evidence from a Panel of Professional Forecasters”, in Applied Economics, Vol. 25, 1993, 
pp. 869-78.
Batchelor, R., (2001), “How useful are the forecasts of intergovernmental agencies? The IMF and 
the OECD versus Consensus”, in Applied Economics, Vol. 33, 2001, pp. 225-235.
Blanchard, O., (1997), “The Medium Run”, in Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2, 1997, 
pp. 89-158.
Bordes, C. and Clerc L., (2004), “Price stability and the ECB’s monetary policy strategy”, Note 
d’études et de recherche de la Banque de France, No. 109, March 2004.
Brown, B. W. and Maital S., (1981), “What do economists know? An empirical study of experts’ 
expectations”, Econometrica, Vol. 49, No. 2, March 1981, pp. 491-504.
Carroll, C., (2001), “The epidemiology of macroeconomic expectations”, NBER Working Paper 
No. 8695, December 2001.
Castelnuovo, E., Nicoletti-Altimari, S. and Rodriguez Palenzuela, D., (2003), “Definition of price 
stability, range and point inflation targets: the anchoring of long-term inflation expectations”, 
ECB Working Paper series, No. 273, September 2003.
Clements, M. P., (2003), “Evaluating the Survey of Professional Forecasters probability 
distributions of expected inflation based on derived event probability forecasts”, mimeo, 
2003. 
Clements, M. P. and Smith, J., (2000), “Evaluating the forecast densities of linear and nonlinear 
models: application to output growth and unemployment”, in Journal of Forecasting, Vol. 19, 
pp. 255-276.
Crawford, A. and Kasumovich (1996), M., “Does Inflation Uncertainty Vary with the Level of 
Inflation?”, Working Papers 96-09, Bank of Canada, 1996.
Croushore, D., (1997), “The Livingstone survey: still useful after all these years”, in Federal 
Reserve Bank of Philadelphia Business Review, March-April 1997, pp. 1-12.
Croushore, D., (1993), “Introducing the Survey of Professional Forecasters”, in Federal Reserve 
Bank of Philadelphia Business Review, November-December 1993, pp. 1-13.
D’Amico, S. and Orphanides, A., (2006), “Uncertainty and Disagreement in Economic Forecasting”, 
mimeo, August 2006.
Diebold, F. X., Gunther, T. A. and Tay, A. S., (1998), “Evaluating Density Forecasts with 
Applications to Financial Risk Management”, in International Economic Review, Vol. 39, 
No. 4, November 1998, pp. 863-883.
REFERENCES62
ECB 
Occasional Paper No 59
April 2007
Diebold, F. X., Hahn, J. and Tay, A. S., (1999), “Multivariate density forecast evaluation and 
calibration in financial risk management: high frequency returns on foreign exchange”, in 
Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 81, 1999, pp. 661-73.
Diebold, F. X., Tay, A. S. and Wallis, K., (1999), “Evaluating density forecasts of inflation: the 
survey of Professional Forecasters”, in Cointegration, Causality and Forecasting: A Festschrift 
in Honour of Clive W. J. Granger, Engle, R. F. and White, H., eds., Oxford University Press, 
1999, pp. 76-90. 
ECB (2005a), Box entitled “Trends in euro area potential output growth” in the July 2005 issue 
of the Monthly Bulletin.
ECB (2005b), Box entitled “A longer-term perspective on structural unemployment in the euro 
area” in the August 2005 issue of the Monthly Bulletin.
ECB (2004a), The monetary policy of the ECB, 2nd edition, January 2004.
ECB (2004b), Article entitled “Extracting information from financial asset prices” in the November 
2004 issue of the Monthly Bulletin.
ECB (2002), Box entitled “Deriving long-term euro area inflation expectations from index-linked 
bonds issued by the French Treasury” in the February 2002 issue of the Monthly Bulletin.
ECB (2000), Article entitled “Developments in and structural features of the euro area labour 
markets” in the May 2000 issue of the Monthly Bulletin.
European Commission (2006), Report by the Economic Policy Committee and the European 
Commission on the impact of ageing populations on public spending, February 2006.
Figlewski, S. and Wachtel, P., (1983), “Rational Expectations, Informational Efficiency and 
Tests using Survey Data: a Reply”, in Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 65, 1983, 
pp. 529-531.
Garcia, J. A., (1993), “An introduction to the ECB’s survey of professional forecasters”, ECB 
Occasional Paper No. 8, September 2003.
Giordani, P. and Söderlind, P., (2003), “Inflation forecast uncertainty”, in European Economic 
Review, Vol. 47, No. 6, 2003, pp. 1037-1059.
Golob, J. E., (1994), “Does inflation uncertainty increases with inflation?”, in Federal Reserve 
Bank of Kansas City Economic Review, Third Quarter, 1994, pp. 27-38.
Hafer, R. W. and Resler D. H., (1980), “The rationality of survey-based inflation forecasts”, in 
Federal Reserve Bank of Saint-Louis Business Review, November 1980, pp. 3-11.
Harri, A. and Brorsen, B. W., (2002), “The overlapping data problem”, Working Paper, Oklahoma 
State University, 2002.63
ECB 
Occasional Paper No 59
April 2007
Holden, K. and Peel, D. A., (1990), “On Testing for Unbiasedness and Efficiency of Forecasts”, 
The Manchester School of Economic & Social Studies, Vol. 58, Issue 2, pp. 120-27.
Issing, O., (2003), (ed.), “Background studies for the ECB’s evaluation of its monetary policy 
strategy”, ECB publication, November 2003.
Keane, M. P. and Runkle, D. E., (1990), “Testing the rationality of price forecasts: new 
evidence from panel data”, in American Economic Review, Vol. 80, No. 4, September 1990, 
pp. 714-735.
Keynes, J. M., (1936), “The general theory of employment, interest and money”, Macmillan 
Cambridge University Press.
Kiley, Michael T., (2000), “Endogenous Price Stickiness and Business Cycle Persistence”, in 
Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, Vol. 32, Issue 1, February 2000, pp. 28-53.
Kontonikas, A., (2004),  “Inflation and inflation uncertainty in the United Kingdom: evidence 
from GARCH modelling”, in Economic Modelling, Elsevier, Vol. 21, Issue 3, 2004, 
pp. 525-543.
Kwan, S., (2005), “Inflation expectations: how the market speaks”, in Federal Reserve Bank of 
San Francisco Economic Letter, 2005-25, 3 October.
Lahiri, K., and Liu F., (2006), “ARCH Models for Multi-period Forecast Uncertainty – A Reality 
Check Using a Panel of Density Forecasts”, in Econometric Analysis of Financial and Economic 
Time Series – Part A, Terrell, D. and Fomby, T. B. (Eds.), Elsevier, JAI Press, 2006.
Lahiri, K., and Liu, F., (2004), “Determinants of multi-period forecast uncertainty using a panel 
of density forecasts”, Econometric Society 2004 Australasian Meetings, No. 329, 2004.
Lahiri, K., Teigland, C. and Zaporowski, M., (1988), “Interest rates and the subjective probability 
distribution of inflation forecasts”, in Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Vol. 20, Issue 2, 
Ohio University Press, 1988, pp. 233-248.
Linden, S., (2003), “Assessment of GDP forecast uncertainty”, European Commission Directorate 
General for Economics and Financial Affairs Economic Papers, No. 184, May 2003.
Muth, J. F., (1961), “Rational Expectations and the Theory of Price Movements”, reprinted in The 
new classical macroeconomics. Volume 1. (1992): 3-23 (International Library of Critical 
Writings in Economics, Vol. 19. Aldershot, United Kingdom: Elgar).
Pesaran, M. H. and Skouras, S., (2002), “Decision-based methods for forecast evaluation”, in A 
Companion to Economic Forecasting, Clements, M. P. and Hendry, D. F. (eds.), Blackwells, 
Oxford, 2002, pp. 268-283.




Occasional Paper No 59
April 2007
Sims, C., (2002), “The role of Models and Probabilities in the Monetary Policy Process”, in 
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2: 2002, pp. 1-62.
Stuart, A., and Ord, J. K., (1994),  “Kendall’s advanced theory of statistics”, Vol. 1, Halsted Press, 
New York 1994.
Tay, A. and Wallis, K. F., (2000), “Density forecasting: a survey”, Econometric Society World 
Congress 2000, Contributed Papers 0370, Econometric Society.
Taylor, J. B., (1999), “Monetary policy rules”, NBER and University of Chicago Press (eds.), 
Chicago, 1999.
Thomas, L. B., (1999), “Survey measures of expected US inflation”, in Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, Vol. 13, No. 4, Fall 1999, pp. 125-144.
Timmermann, A., (2006), “An evaluation of the World Economic Outlook Forecasts”, IMF 
Working Paper WP/06/59, March 2006.
Urich, T. J. and P. Wachtel, (1984), “The effects of inflation and money supply announcements 
on interest rates”, in Journal of Finance, Vol. 39, No. 4, September 1984, pp. 1177-88.
Wallis, K. F., (2004), “An assessment of Bank of England and National Institute inflation forecast 
uncertainties, in National Institute Economic Review, No. 189, 2004, pp. 64-71.
Wallis, K. F., (2001), “Chi-squared test of interval and density forecast and the Bank of England’s 
fan Charts”, ECB Working Paper No. 83, November 2001.
Zarnowitz, V. and Lambros, L. A., (1987), “Consensus and Uncertainty in Economic Prediction”, 
in Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 95, No. 3, 1987, pp. 591-621.65
ECB 




1  “The impact of the euro on money and bond markets” by J. Santillán, M. Bayle and
C. Thygesen, July 2000.
2  “The effective exchange rates of the euro” by L. Buldorini, S. Makrydakis and C. Thimann, 
February 2002.
3  “Estimating the trend of M3 income velocity underlying the reference value for monetary 
growth” by C. Brand, D. Gerdesmeier and B. Roffia, May 2002.
4  “Labour force developments in the euro area since the 1980s” by V. Genre and
R. Gómez-Salvador, July 2002.
5  “The evolution of clearing and central counterparty services for exchange-traded derivatives 
in the United States and Europe: a comparison” by D. Russo, T. L. Hart and A. Schönenberger, 
September 2002.
6  “Banking integration in the euro area” by I. Cabral, F. Dierick and J. Vesala, 
December 2002.
7  “Economic relations with regions neighbouring the euro area in the ‘Euro Time Zone’” by   
F. Mazzaferro, A. Mehl, M. Sturm, C. Thimann and A. Winkler, December 2002.
8  “An introduction to the ECB’s survey of professional forecasters” by J. A. Garcia, 
September 2003.
9  “Fiscal adjustment in 1991-2002: stylised facts and policy implications” by M. G. Briotti, 
February 2004.
10  “The acceding countries’ strategies towards ERM II and the adoption of the euro: an analytical 
review” by a staff team led by P. Backé and C. Thimann and including O. Arratibel, O. Calvo-
Gonzalez, A. Mehl and C. Nerlich, February 2004.
11  “Official dollarisation/euroisation: motives, features and policy implications of current cases” 
by A. Winkler, F. Mazzaferro, C. Nerlich and C. Thimann, February 2004.
12  “Understanding the impact of the external dimension on the euro area: trade, capital flows 
and other international macroeconomic linkages“ by R. Anderton, F. di Mauro and F. Moneta, 
March 2004.
13  “Fair value accounting and financial stability” by a staff team led by A. Enria and including 
L. Cappiello, F. Dierick, S. Grittini, A. Maddaloni, P. Molitor, F. Pires and P. Poloni, 
April 2004.
14  “Measuring financial integration in the euro area” by L. Baele, A. Ferrando, P. Hördahl,   






Occasional Paper No 59
April 2007
15  “Quality adjustment of European price statistics and the role for hedonics” by H. Ahnert and 
G. Kenny, May 2004.
16  “Market dynamics associated with credit ratings: a literature review” by F. Gonzalez, F. Haas, 
R. Johannes, M. Persson, L. Toledo, R. Violi, M. Wieland and C. Zins, June 2004.
17 “Corporate ‘excesses’ and financial market dynamics” by A. Maddaloni and D. Pain, 
July 2004.
18  “The international role of the euro: evidence from bonds issued by non-euro area residents” 
by A. Geis, A. Mehl and S. Wredenborg, July 2004.
19  “Sectoral specialisation in the EU: a macroeconomic perspective” by MPC task force of the 
ESCB, July 2004.
20  “The supervision of mixed financial services groups in Europe” by F. Dierick, August 2004.
21  “Governance of securities clearing and settlement systems” by D. Russo, T. Hart, M. C. 
Malaguti and C. Papathanassiou, October 2004.
22  “Assessing potential output growth in the euro area: a growth accounting perspective” by 
A. Musso and T. Westermann, January 2005.
23  “The bank lending survey for the euro area” by J. Berg, A. van Rixtel, A. Ferrando, G. de 
Bondt and S. Scopel, February 2005.
24  “Wage diversity in the euro area: an overview of labour cost differentials across industries” 
by V. Genre, D. Momferatou and G. Mourre, February 2005.
25  “Government debt management in the euro area: recent theoretical developments and changes 
in practices” by G. Wolswijk and J. de Haan, March 2005.
26  “The analysis of banking sector health using macro-prudential indicators” by L. Mörttinen,   
P. Poloni, P. Sandars and J. Vesala, March 2005.
27  “The EU budget – how much scope for institutional reform?” by H. Enderlein, J. Lindner,   
O. Calvo-Gonzalez, R. Ritter, April 2005. 
28  “Reforms in selected EU network industries” by R. Martin, M. Roma, I. Vansteenkiste,   
April 2005.
29  “Wealth and asset price effects on economic activity”, by F. Altissimo, E. Georgiou,  T. Sastre, 
M. T. Valderrama, G. Sterne, M. Stocker, M. Weth, K. Whelan, A. Willman, June 2005.
30  “Competitiveness and the export performance of the euro area”, by a Task Force of the 
Monetary Policy Committee of the European System of Central Banks, June 2005.
31  “Regional monetary integration in the member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)” 
by M. Sturm and N. Siegfried, June 2005.67
ECB 
Occasional Paper No 59
April 2007
32  “Managing financial crises in emerging market economies: experience with the involvement 
of private sector creditors” by an International Relations Committee task force, July 2005.
33 “Integration of securities market infrastructures in the euro area” by H. Schmiedel, 
A. Schönenberger, July 2005.
34  “Hedge funds and their implications for financial stability” by T. Garbaravicius and F. Dierick, 
August 2005.
35  “The institutional framework for financial market policy in the USA seen from an EU 
perspective” by R. Petschnigg, September 2005. 
36  “Economic and monetary integration of the new Member States: helping to chart the route” 
by J. Angeloni, M. Flad and F. P. Mongelli, September 2005.
37  “Financing conditions in the euro area” by L. Bê Duc, G. de Bondt, A. Calza, D. Marqués 
Ibáñez, A. van Rixtel and S. Scopel, September 2005.
38 “Economic reactions to public finance consolidation: a survey of the literature” by 
M. G. Briotti, October 2005.
39  “Labour productivity in the Nordic EU countries: a comparative overview and explanatory 
factors – 1998-2004” by A. Annenkov and C. Madaschi, October 2005.
40 “What does European institutional integration tell us about trade integration?” by 
F. P. Mongelli, E. Dorrucci and I. Agur, December 2005.
41 “Trends and patterns in working time across euro area countries 1970-2004: causes 
and consequences” by N. Leiner-Killinger, C. Madaschi and M. Ward-Warmedinger, 
December 2005.
42  “The New Basel Capital Framework and its implementation in the European Union” by 
F. Dierick, F. Pires, M. Scheicher and K. G. Spitzer, December 2005.
43  “The accumulation of foreign reserves” by an International Relations Committee Task Force, 
February 2006.
44  “Competition, productivity and prices in the euro area services sector” by a Task Force of the 
Monetary Policy Committee of the European System of Central banks, April 2006.
45 “Output growth differentials across the euro area countries: Some stylised facts” by 
N. Benalal, J. L. Diaz del Hoyo, B. Pierluigi and N. Vidalis, May 2006.
46  “Inflation persistence and price-setting behaviour in the euro area – a summary of the IPN 
evidence”, by F. Altissimo, M. Ehrmann and F. Smets, June 2006.
47  “The reform and implementation of the stability and growth pact” by R. Morris, H. Ongena 






Occasional Paper No 59
April 2007
48  “Macroeconomic and financial stability challenges for acceding and candidate countries” by 
the International Relations Committee Task Force on Enlargement, July 2006.
49  “Credit risk mitigation in central bank operations and its effects on financial markets: the case 
of the Eurosystem” by U. Bindseil and F. Papadia, August 2006.
50  “Implications for liquidity from innovation and transparency in the European corporate bond 
market” by M. Laganá, M. Peřina, I. von Köppen-Mertes and A. Persaud, August 2006. 
51  “Macroeconomic implications of demographic developments in the euro area” by A. Maddaloni, 
A. Musso, P. Rother, M. Ward-Warmedinger and T. Westermann, August 2006.
52 “Cross-border labour mobility within an enlarged EU” by F. F. Heinz and M. Ward-
Warmedinger, October 2006.
53  “Labour productivity developments in the euro area” by R. Gomez-Salvador, A. Musso, 
M. Stocker and J. Turunen, October 2006.
54  “Quantitative quality indicators for statistics – an application to euro area balance of payment 
statistics” by V. Damia and C. Picón Aguilar, November 2006.
55 “Globalisation and euro area trade: Interactions and challenges” by U. Baumann and 
F. di Mauro, February 2007.
56  “Assessing fiscal soundness: Theory and practice” by N. Giammarioli, C. Nickel, P. Rother, 
J.-P. Vidal, March 2007.
57  “Understanding price developments and consumer price indices in south-eastern Europe” by 
S. Herrmann and E. K. Polgar, March 2007.
58  “Long-term growth prospects for the Russian economy” by R. Beck, A. Kamps and E. Mileva, 
March 2007.
59  “The ECB survey of professional forecasters (SPF) – A review after eight years’ experience” 
by C. Bowles, R. Friz, V. Genre, G. Kenny, A. Meyler andT. Rautanen, March 2007.ISSN 1607148-4
9 771607 148006
OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES
NO 59 / APRIL 2007
THE ECB SURVEY OF 
PROFESSIONAL 
FORECASTERS (SPF) 
A REVIEW AFTER EIGHT 
YEARS’ EXPERIENCE 
by Carlos Bowles, Roberta Friz, 
Veronique Genre, Geoff Kenny, 
Aidan Meyler and Tuomas Rautanen